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Jeremy C. Kress† 
 Sixty years ago, Congress established a federal pre-approval regime for 
bank mergers to protect consumers from then-unprecedented consolidation in 
the banking sector. This process worked well for several decades, but it has 
since atrophied, producing numerous “too big to fail” banks. 
This Article contends that regulators’ current approach to evaluating 
bank merger proposals is poorly suited for modern financial markets. 
Policymakers and scholars have traditionally focused on a single issue: 
whether a bank merger would reduce competition. Over the past two decades, 
however, changes in bank regulation and market structure—including the 
repeal of interstate banking restrictions and the emergence of nonbank 
financial service providers—have rendered bank antitrust analysis largely 
obsolete. As a result, regulators have rubber-stamped recent bank mergers, 
despite evidence that such deals could harm consumers and destabilize 
financial markets. 
This Article asserts that contemporary bank merger analysis should 
instead emphasize statutory factors that regulators have long neglected: 
whether a proposed merger would increase systemic risks, enhance the public 
welfare, and strengthen the relevant institutions. This Article urges regulators 
to modernize their approach, and it proposes a novel framework to ensure that 
bank merger oversight safeguards the financial system. The proposals 
contained herein have far-reaching implications not only for bank regulation 
but also for the ongoing debate over merger policy in technology, agriculture, 
and other industries. 
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Introduction 
The biggest irony of the 2008 financial crisis is that the market crash was 
both initially triggered and ultimately alleviated by massive bank mergers. A 
wave of mergers by Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo 
in the late 1990s created the “too big to fail” banks that became so central to 
the crisis.1 Less than a decade later, the federal government orchestrated 
multibillion-dollar emergency acquisitions by several of these firms to stem the 
panic.2 Thus, these four dominant banks—which control 42% of the assets in 
the U.S. banking system—owe their existence to megamergers.3 Now, critics 
worry that that these firms are not only “too big to fail,” but also “too big to 
jail,” “too big to manage,” and “too big to supervise.”4 
 
1. See Donald I. Baker, From Philadelphia National Bank to Too Big to Fail: How Modern 
Financial Markets Have Outrun Antitrust Law as a Source of Useful Structural Remedies, 80 
ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 359-62 (2015) (tracing the acquisition history of the United States’ largest banks). 
2. See id. at 358-60 (discussing Bank of America’s crisis-driven acquisition of Merrill Lynch, 
JPMorgan’s takeover of Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo’s merger with 
Wachovia). 
3. See Jeff Cox, 5 Biggest Banks Now Own Almost Half the Industry, CNBC (Apr. 15, 2015), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/15/5-biggest-banks-now-own-almost-half-the-industry.html 
[https://perma.cc/5G66-NMW9] (noting that JPMorgan, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Citibank 
own 42.04% of U.S. bank assets). 
4. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Kress, Solving Banking’s ‘Too Big to Manage’ Problem, 104 MINN. L. 
REV. 171, 186-92 (2019) (explaining banking’s “too big to manage” phenomenon); Lev Menand, Too 
Big to Supervise: The Rise of Financial Conglomerates and the Decline of Discretionary Oversight in 
Banking, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1527, 1583 (2018) (examining why some banks may be “too big to 
supervise”); Saule T. Omarova, The “Too Big to Fail” Problem, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2495, 2499-504 
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Of course, this is not the first time that bank mergers have raised public 
policy concerns. In the 1950s, for example, a “massive merger movement” 
sparked fears of then-unprecedented consolidation in the financial sector.5 
Many of these deals did not require federal approval.6 Several years later, 
Congress established a comprehensive oversight regime for bank mergers in an 
attempt to rein in unregulated consolidation. Under the Bank Merger Act of 
1960, banks would have to get approval from their federal regulators before 
combining.7 
This pre-approval system worked well for several decades. While the 
Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) signed off on the majority of bank 
merger applications, they regularly exercised their power to block transactions 
they determined would not be in the public interest.8 This Article contends, 
however, that policymakers have allowed the once-powerful bank merger 
review process to atrophy over time, and the current framework is no longer 
adequate to safeguard modern financial markets. In many respects, the United 
States has reverted to pre-1950s policies favoring bank consolidation, thereby 
increasing risks to consumers and the broader financial system. 
The Bank Merger Act and its companion statute, the Bank Holding 
Company Act, direct the federal banking agencies to consider four main factors 
when evaluating a proposed merger: (1) the proposal’s potential 
anticompetitive effects, (2) possible risks to financial stability, (3) the 
transaction’s probable effect on the public interest, and (4) the companies’ 
financial and managerial resources.9 The statutes authorize the agencies to 
reject a merger proposal if any one of these factors weighs against approval.10 
Although Congress instructed the banking agencies to consider multiple 
factors when reviewing bank merger proposals, legal scholarship on bank 
mergers has focused almost exclusively on just one: competition. Since the 
1950s, dozens of law review articles have analyzed competitive considerations 
 
(2019) (discussing the “too big to fail” problem); Nizan Geslevich Packin, Breaking Bad? Too-Big-To-
Fail Banks Not Guilty as Charged, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1089, 1092-94 (2014) (describing the “too big 
to jail” issue). 
5. See BERNARD SHULL & GERALD A. HANWECK, BANK MERGERS IN A DEREGULATED 
ENVIRONMENT 85 (2001). 
6. See Benjamin J. Klebaner, Federal Control of Commercial Bank Mergers, 37 IND. L.J. 287, 
298 (1962). 
7. Act of May 13, 1960 (Bank Merger Act), Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2018)). 
8. See SHULL & HANWECK, supra note 5, at 97 (discussing denials of merger applications). 
9. Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2018); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 3(c), 
12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2018). This Article refers to the Bank Merger Act and Bank Holding Company 
Act collectively as the “bank merger statutes.” 
10. See Bd. of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 243-48 (1978) (holding 
that each Bank Holding Company Act factor provides an independent, solely sufficient basis on which 
the Federal Reserve may deny a merger application). 
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in bank mergers.11 Yet scholars have devoted virtually no attention to the other, 
equally relevant statutory considerations.12 Federal Reserve officials have 
noted the dearth of scholarship on bank merger factors other than competition 
and urged academics to fill the void.13 
Due to scholars’ narrow focus on antitrust issues in bank mergers, the 
legal literature has not assessed the extent to which the banking agencies have 
fulfilled their mandate to rigorously review merger proposals under all the 
applicable statutory standards. Recent evidence suggests that the agencies are 
falling short. Bank merger approval rates are at historic highs. The Federal 
Reserve, for example, signed off on 95% of merger applications in 2018—its 
highest approval rate since it began keeping track.14 Meanwhile, the agencies 
are greenlighting merger proposals at record speed. In the past, the banking 
agencies have taken nearly a full year, on average, to review bank mergers that 
attract adverse public comments.15 But in 2018, the Federal Reserve approved 
 
11. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Banking Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 589 
(1949); Peter C. Carstensen, Restricting the Power to Promote Competition in Banking: A Foolish 
Consistency Among the Circuits, 1983 DUKE L.J. 580; Joseph E. Casson & Bernie R. Burrus, Federal 
Regulation of Bank Mergers, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 677 (1969); Rodgin Cohen, The New Phase of Bank 
Consolidation: Regulatory Issues and Considerations, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63 (1992); Earl W. 
Kintner & Hugh C. Hansen, A Review of the Law of Bank Mergers, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 213 
(1972); Klebaner, supra note 6; J. Robert Kramer II, Antitrust Review in Banking and Defense, 11 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 111 (2002); William T. Lifland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Bank Mergers, 32 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (1967); William A. Mogel, Bank Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 17 AM. 
U. L. REV. 57 (1967); Robert F. Roach, Bank Mergers and the Antitrust Laws: The Case for Dual State 
and Federal Enforcement, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95 (1994); J. William Via, Jr., The Administration 
of the Bank Merger and Bank Holding Company Acts: Confusion Compounded, 51 VA. L. REV. 1517 
(1965); William Wemple & Kenneth Cutler, The Federal Bank Merger Law and the Antitrust Laws, 16 
BUS. LAW. 994 (1961). In addition, several excellent student notes have addressed antitrust 
considerations in bank mergers. See, e.g., Note, Commercial Bank Mergers: The Case for Procedural 
and Substantive Deregulation, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1914 (1982); Gina M. Killian, Note, Bank Mergers 
and the Department of Justice’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A Critique and Proposal, 69 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 857 (1994); Tim McCarthy, Note, Refining Product Market Definition in the Antitrust 
Analysis of Bank Mergers, 46 DUKE L.J. 865 (1997); John S. Watson, Comment, Bank Mergers: A New 
Standard of Evaluation?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 81 (1967). 
12. Professor Mehrsa Baradaran has written the most complete analysis of the public interest 
factor to date. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1284, 
1337-42 (2014). No legal scholarship has addressed the financial stability factor or financial and 
managerial considerations in bank-merger regulation. 
13. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Distinguished Jurist Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law School: Financial Stability 
Regulation 19-20 (Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/files/tarullo20121010a.pdf [https://perma.cc/22KN-G6M3] (encouraging scholarly research on 
the financial-stability factor). 
14. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 6 SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON BANKING 
APPLICATIONS ACTIVITY: JULY 1–DECEMBER 31, 2018, at 3 (2019) [hereinafter SEMIANNUAL REPORT 
ON BANKING APPLICATIONS—YEAR-END 2018], 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/semiannual-report-on-banking-applications-
20190329.pdf [https://perma.cc/763S-EM3H]; see also Jeremy Kress, Fed Is a Rubber Stamp for Bank 
Mergers—It’s a Problem, AM. BANKER (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/fed-
is-a-rubber-stamp-for-bank-mergers-its-a-problem [https://perma.cc/RD2V-D5ZD]. 
15. See SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON BANKING APPLICATIONS—YEAR-END 2018, supra note 14, 
at 4. 
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such applications in an average of four months.16 The agencies, moreover, have 
not formally denied a merger application in more than fifteen years.17 Although 
by no means conclusive, this track record raises serious doubts about the 
efficacy of the agencies’ existing bank merger framework. 
From a strictly antitrust perspective, the speed with which the agencies 
have signed off on recent bank mergers is unsurprising. In contrast to the mid-
twentieth century, modern-day bank mergers are less likely to have significant 
anticompetitive effects. That is because two long-term trends in bank 
regulation and market structure have increased competition in many local 
banking markets. First, liberalized geographic restrictions in the 1980s and 
1990s permitted banks to expand interstate for the first time, freeing firms to 
enter out-of-state banking markets that had long been insulated from 
competition.18 Second, the emergence of various nonbank financial 
companies—from depository institutions like thrifts and credit unions to more 
recent “fintech” firms—has enhanced competition for many financial products 
that were once exclusively offered by banks.19 As a result of these trends, 
today’s bank mergers are less likely to exceed quantitative Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) thresholds established by the banking agencies and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) in jointly promulgated Bank Merger Guidelines.20 
Thus, the vast majority of bank merger proposals appear to pose minimal 
competitive issues and earn the banking agencies’ quick approval. 
From a broader societal perspective, however, the agencies’ rubber-
stamping of bank mergers is deeply troubling. The weight of the available 
evidence suggests that bank consolidation hurts consumers and could imperil 
the financial system. By most accounts, for example, consolidation among 
large banks elevates risks to financial stability.21 Indeed, according to the 
Federal Reserve’s own research, distress at a single large bank poses a 
significantly greater threat to the economy than distress at several smaller 
banks with equivalent total assets.22 Meanwhile, large bank mergers pose 
serious integration risks and tend not to deliver promised efficiency gains or 
 
16. See id. 
17. Based on the author’s comprehensive review of bank merger and acquisition decisions by 
the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC, the agencies last denied a merger application in 2003. See Illini 
Corp., 89 Fed. Res. Bull. 85 (2003). 
18. See SHULL & HANWECK, supra note 5, at 93. 
19. See Edward Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank Merger Reform Takes an Extended 
Philadelphia National Bank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 595, 631 (2008). 
20. Antitrust Div., Bank Merger Competitive Review—Introduction and Overview, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST. (Sept. 2000) [hereinafter Bank Merger Guidelines], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/6472.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5VG-
ZLAJ]; see also infra Section II.A (discussing decline in local banking market concentration). 
21. See, e.g., Gregor N.F. Weiss et al., Systemic Risk and Bank Consolidation: International 
Evidence, 40 J. BANKING & FIN. 165, 174-77 (2014) (finding a significant increase in the post-merger 
systemic risk of consolidating banks and their competitors). 
22. See Amy G. Lorenc & Jeffery Y. Zhang, The Differential Impact of Bank Size on Systemic 
Risk 12-18 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2018-066, 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018066pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ULZ-ABG9]. 
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public benefits.23 Moreover, numerous empirical studies have found that bank 
mergers lower the availability and increase the cost of credit for borrowers, 
especially small businesses.24 And merging banks typically close branches, 
inconveniencing customers who rely on proximity to branch offices.25 In this 
light, the banking agencies’ recent track record of quickly approving nearly 
every merger proposal suggests that they are neglecting their responsibility to 
consider all the statutory factors as Congress intended. 
This Article therefore urges the banking agencies to modernize their 
approach to mergers and acquisitions. In particular, the agencies should 
substantially enhance their scrutiny of bank merger proposals using the three 
statutory factors that to date have been overlooked in the legal literature—
namely, financial stability, the public interest, and financial and managerial 
considerations. 
First, the banking agencies should adopt quantitative systemic risk limits 
for bank mergers using commonly accepted financial stability metrics. In the 
decade since Congress added the financial stability factor to the bank merger 
statutes, the agencies have relied on ad hoc assessments of a merged bank’s 
size, complexity, interconnectedness, and activities to determine whether a 
proposal would increase systemic risks.26 This approach, however, is 
rudimentary compared to quantitative financial stability metrics—such as the 
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision’s assessment methodology for global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs)—that the agencies have incorporated 
into their regulations and supervisory practices.27 To ensure that bank 
consolidation does not threaten financial stability, the agencies should rely on 
these well-developed metrics to establish systemic risk limits for merger 
proposals akin to the HHI thresholds they use to assess a merger’s 
anticompetitive effects. 
 
23. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks 
of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1010-12 (1992) (discussing integration problems in large 
bank mergers); see also Erik Devos et al., Efficiency and Market Power Gains in Bank Megamergers: 
Evidence from Value Line Forecasts, 45 FIN. MGMT. 1011, 1029 (2016) (finding that mergers resulting 
in banks with more than $150 billion in assets do not produce efficiency gains). 
24. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
25. See Hoai-Luu Q. Nguyen, Are Credit Markets Still Local? Evidence from Bank Branch 
Closings, 11 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 15-17 (2019) (finding evidence of significant branch 
closures by merging banks); Lydia DePillis, The Internet Didn’t Kill Bank Branches. Bank Mergers 
Did., WASH. POST (July 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/07/09/the-
internet-didnt-kill-bank-branches-bank-mergers-did [https://perma.cc/E5HS-TNZR]. 
26. See Capital One Fin. Corp., 98 Fed. Res. Bull. 5, 23-27 (2012) (describing the Federal 
Reserve’s framework for analyzing financial stability considerations in bank merger and acquisition 
proposals). 
27. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Global Systemically Important Banks: 
Updated Assessment Methodology and the Higher Loss Absorbency Requirement, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS 4-11 (2013) [hereinafter BCBS Assessment Methodology], 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.pdf [https://perma.cc/K94S-9BFM] (discussing methodology for 
assessing a bank’s systemic importance). The banking agencies rely on the Basel Committee’s 
methodology and other quantitative financial stability metrics for several regulatory and supervisory 
purposes. See infra Section IV.A. 
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Second, the agencies should demand more convincing evidence that a 
proposed merger will benefit the public. Despite their statutory mandate to 
consider “the convenience and needs of the community to be served,” the 
agencies’ public interest analyses are typically perfunctory and focus on 
advantages to the banks themselves—such as projected cost savings—rather 
than to their customers.28 Given the aforementioned negative consequences of 
bank consolidation, however, the agencies should begin reviewing a merger 
proposal with a presumption that the combination will not produce benefits to 
the public, absent strong evidence to the contrary. Similarly, the agencies 
should insist that bank merger applicants have outstanding records of serving 
low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities under the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA).29 Historically, the agencies have signed off on 
mergers by banks with merely satisfactory CRA ratings.30 Elevating this 
standard would ensure that only firms committed to meeting the credit needs of 
LMI communities are permitted to expand. Finally, Congress should authorize 
the Consumer Financial Projection Bureau (CFPB) to block a bank merger on 
consumer protection grounds, similar to the DOJ’s power to prevent an 
anticompetitive bank merger. 
Third, the banking agencies should strengthen the financial criteria they 
use to evaluate bank merger proposals. By law, the Federal Reserve may 
approve an interstate acquisition by a bank holding company (BHC) only if the 
BHC is “well capitalized.”31 Lawmakers insisted that acquiring BHCs should 
have substantially more than the minimum amount of capital to provide a 
buffer against the uncertainties inherent in bank mergers.32 By regulation, 
however, the Federal Reserve has set the well-capitalized threshold just barely 
above its minimum capital requirements.33 This weak standard leads to the odd 
result that an acquiring BHC could be considered well capitalized and 
nonetheless fail the Federal Reserve’s annual stress tests. The Federal Reserve 
should therefore substantially increase its definition of “well capitalized” to 
ensure that only strong BHCs may expand via merger. 
This Article comes at a critical time. The Economic Growth, Regulatory 
Relief and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (EGRRCPA) weakened 
regulations on many of the largest U.S. banks,34 leading commentators to 
 
28. See Baradaran, supra note 12, at 1338-39; Mitria Wilson, Protecting the Public’s 
Interests: A Consumer-Focused Reassessment of the Standard for Bank Mergers and Acquisitions, 130 
BANKING L.J. 351, 372 n.8 (2013). 
29. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2018). 
30. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 14-2, ENHANCING 
TRANSPARENCY IN THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S APPLICATIONS PROCESS 3 (2014) [hereinafter ENHANCING 
TRANSPARENCY IN THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S APPLICATIONS PROCESS], 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1402.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM93-9WN7]. 
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(A) (2018). 
32. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 72. 
33. See infra Section IV.C. 
34. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 
132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). For analysis of how the 
10. KRESS ARTICLE. PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  10:09 AM 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:435, 2020 
442 
 
predict a wave of consolidation among regional banks.35 Shortly thereafter, 
regional banks BB&T and SunTrust announced a “merger of equals,” creating 
the sixth-largest bank in the United States—by far the biggest bank merger 
since the financial crisis.36 Federal regulators swiftly approved the BB&T-
SunTrust deal, sparking speculation of further consolidation among large 
banks.37 It is essential, therefore, that regulators enhance their scrutiny of bank 
merger proposals to ensure that future bank consolidation serves the public 
interest and does not increase risks to the financial system. 
More generally, this Article extends an emerging theme in the antitrust 
literature. Over the past several years, antitrust scholars have increasingly 
argued that policymakers should take into account a broader range of public 
interest considerations when evaluating mergers.38 The antitrust laws’ 
traditional focus on pricing, the argument goes, is too narrow and overlooks 
potentially harmful effects of corporate “bigness,” ranging from stagnant wages 
to poor product quality and loss of privacy.39 In contrast to the general antitrust 
laws, the bank merger statutes expressly authorize the banking agencies to 
consider these and other expansive public-interest factors when evaluating a 
merger proposal. As policymakers trend toward enlarging the scope of 
 
EGRRCPA eased regulations on big banks, see Michael S. Barr, Dear Congress: Reg Relief Bill Is a 
Giveaway for Large Banks, AM. BANKER (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/dear-congress-reg-relief-bill-is-a-giveaway-for-large-banks 
[https://perma.cc/PLX5-GDRS]; Jeffrey Gordon, Stock Market Gyrations a Reminder Wall Street Banks 
Need Regulation, THE HILL (Mar. 2, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/376439-stock-market-
gyrations-a-reminder-wall-street-banks-need-regulation [https://perma.cc/2VWF-3JNM]; Jeremy Kress, 
Beware of the Bank Deregulation Trojan Horse, THE HILL (Feb. 7, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/ 
finance/372764-beware-of-the-bank-deregulation-trojan-horse [https://perma.cc/GL5K-BEW4]; Jennifer 
Taub, Mitch McConnell’s Big Gift to the Big Banks, CNN (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/05/opinions/mitch-mcconnell-bank-lobbyist-act-opinion-taub/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2UGW-YM93]; and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Raising SIFI Threshold to $250B Ignores 
Lessons of Past Crises, AM. BANKER (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/raising-
sifi-threshold-to-250b-ignores-lessons-of-past-crises [https://perma.cc/SZX8-HFGU]. 
35. See, e.g., Ben Walsh, Expect More Bank Mergers After Dodd-Frank Rollback, BARRON’S 
(May 26, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/expect-more-bank-mergers-after-dodd-frank-
rollback-1527292801 [https://perma.cc/K7MX-XNS3]. 
36. See Rachel Louise Ensign & Allison Prang, BB&T to Buy SunTrust in Largest Bank Deal 
Since the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/suntrust-bb-t-to-
combine-in-all-stock-merger-11549537817 [https://perma.cc/H2E3-9EU7]. 
37. See, e.g., Jim Dobbs, Three Takeaways from Regulators’ Approval of the BB&T-SunTrust 
Merger, AM. BANKER (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/three-takeaways-from-
regulators-approval-of-the-bb-t-suntrust-merger [https://perma.cc/FP8K-QL35] (“The speed of the 
regulators’ approval, and a lack of onerous conditions or restrictions, likely will be viewed favorably by 
other big banks that are mulling a merger or acquisition.”); see also The Biggest Bank Merger Since the 
Crisis May Herald More, ECONOMIST (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics/2019/02/16/the-biggest-bank-merger-since-the-crisis-may-herald-more 
[https://perma.cc/C92N-SVBQ]. Morgan Stanley’s February 2020 agreement to acquire online 
brokerage E*Trade triggered further speculation of large bank acquisitions. See Jennifer Surane, 
Morgan Stanley Ignites Banking Takeover Buzz with Gorman’s Deal, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-21/morgan-stanley-ignites-banking-takeover-buzz-
with-gorman-s-deal [https://perma.cc/Z33Y-MPTL]. 
38. See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018); 
Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017). 
39. See WU, supra note 38, at 68-73, 135-39; Khan, supra note 38, at 739. 
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traditional merger review, therefore, it is especially critical that the banking 
agencies modernize their approach to bank merger oversight. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the bank merger review 
process and its traditional emphasis on competitive considerations. Part II then 
identifies weaknesses in regulators’ current approach to bank mergers. It 
presents evidence that the banking agencies have become increasingly 
permissive of bank consolidation over time, and it explains the risks that 
unrestrained bank mergers pose to consumers and the financial system. Next, 
Part III demonstrates that more expansive bank merger oversight is consistent 
with longstanding justifications for financial regulation. Part IV proposes a 
novel framework for modernizing bank merger regulation, including specific 
recommendations to prevent excessive consolidation by reviving long-
neglected statutory factors.40 Finally, Part IV explores how effective bank 
merger regulation could inform general antitrust enforcement. The Article 
concludes that the recommendations to modernize bank merger review 
presented herein are essential to protect consumers and safeguard the financial 
system. 
I. Traditional Bank Merger Review 
This Part examines the regulatory framework governing U.S. bank 
consolidation. Section I.A explores how and why Congress originally 
authorized the banking agencies to pre-approve merger proposals. It also lays 
out the statutory factors the agencies must use when evaluating bank merger 
applications. Section I.B then focuses on one of these factors—antitrust—that 
originally dominated bank merger oversight. It contends that, despite antitrust’s 
initial prominence in the bank merger review process, competitive 
considerations have now become nearly obsolete due to significant changes in 
bank regulation and market dynamics. 
A. Bank Merger Regulation: History and Statutory Standards 
Bank merger regulation has evolved dramatically within the past century, 
moving from a laissez faire system in the early 1900s to a comprehensive 
federal pre-approval regime today. Early on, the federal government played an 
extremely limited role in overseeing bank merger proposals. Today, however, 
the federal banking agencies have nearly unfettered authority to review bank 
 
40. After an initial draft of this Article was made public, Senator Elizabeth Warren and 
Representative Chuy Garcia introduced legislation that is substantially based on these policy 
recommendations. See Bank Merger Review Modernization Act of 2019, H.R. 5318, 116th Cong. 
(2019); see also Press Release, Senator Warren and Representative Garcia Announce Introduction of the 
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mergers based on several far-reaching statutory factors. This Section explores 
the expansion of the federal banking agencies’ role in bank merger regulation. 
Congress’s initial attempts to regulate bank mergers in the early twentieth 
century were largely ineffective. The National Bank Consolidation Act of 1918 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 each required a bank to obtain a 
federal banking agency’s approval before merging.41 These statutes, however, 
were deficient in two critical respects. First, the laws did not specify standards 
the agencies were to use when assessing a merger proposal. Lacking 
congressional direction, the agencies generally approved mergers after only 
cursory, unsophisticated evaluations.42 Second, these early statutes were 
plagued by serious gaps, which in many cases allowed banks to structure deals 
in ways that avoided review entirely.43 For example, a bank merger was exempt 
from federal pre-approval as long as the transaction did not deplete the capital 
and surplus of the combining banks.44 As a result of these shortcomings, the 
federal banking agencies were not a meaningful constraint on early bank 
mergers. 
The DOJ’s Antitrust Division, meanwhile, generally ignored 
consolidation in the banking sector, as well. Early twentieth century 
policymakers regarded banks as exempt from the Clayton and Sherman 
Antitrust Acts.45 As Professors Bernard Shull and Gerald Hanweck observed, 
“through the mid-1940s, banking’s effective immunity from the antitrust laws 
was unquestioned.”46 Thus, neither the federal banking agencies nor the DOJ 
took a significant interest in bank mergers during the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
Negligible federal oversight contributed to a “massive merger movement” 
in the 1950s.47 Over the course of the decade, more than 2,600 banks 
combined—often without federal approval.48 Two of the three largest U.S. 
banks—Chase National and National City—solidified their market dominance 
through sizable mergers.49 In 1959 alone, twenty-five of the one hundred 
 
41. National Bank Consolidation Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-240, 40 Stat. 1043, 1043-44 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 215-215b (2018)); Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. 
No. 81-797, § 2, 64 Stat. 873, 892 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2018)). 
42. See Casson & Burrus, supra note 11, at 682; Kintner & Hansen, supra note 11, at 218. 
43. See Lifland, supra note 11, at 18 n.19. 
44. See Klebaner, supra note 11, at 298. 
45. See Berle, supra note 11, at 590. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibit the 
monopolization or restraint of “commerce,” were thought not to apply to banking, which lawyers 
generally considered to be distinct from commerce. See id. (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869)); 
see also Casson & Burrus, supra note 11, at 681; Lifland, supra note 11, at 18 n.19. Similarly, section 7 
of the Clayton Act, which governs a company’s acquisition of stock that substantially lessens 
competition, was thought to be inapplicable to bank mergers, which were usually structured as asset 
sales rather than stock acquisitions. See Casson & Burrus, supra note 11, at 682; Lifland, supra note 11, 
at 16. 
46. SHULL & HANWECK, supra note 5, at 80. 
47. See id. at 85. 
48. See id.; see also Casson & Burrus, supra note 11, at 683. 
49. See SHULL & HANWECK, supra note 5, at 85. 
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largest U.S. banks grew through acquisition.50 As a result of this merger spree, 
many banking markets reached unprecedented levels of concentration, stoking 
widespread concerns about excessive consolidation in the financial sector.51 
In an effort to rein in unregulated mergers, Congress adopted the Bank 
Merger Act of 1960, which established a federal regulatory regime for bank 
combinations.52 The Act mandated that, before merging, a bank must obtain 
approval from its primary regulator—the OCC for national banks, the Federal 
Reserve for state member banks, or the FDIC for state nonmember banks.53 
The Act enumerated three factors the agencies must consider when evaluating a 
merger: (1) “the effect of the transaction on competition,” (2) “the convenience 
and needs of the community to be served,” and (3) “the financial . . . condition 
of each of the banks involved” and “the general character of [their] 
management.”54 Proponents of the Act believed that these “uniform and 
appropriate standards” would streamline federal oversight of bank mergers and 
slow the consolidation of the financial sector.55 
Rather than clarifying the federal government’s role in bank mergers, 
however, the Bank Merger Act amplified confusion about antitrust enforcement 
in banking. Despite its traditional indifference to bank mergers, the DOJ began 
attempting to exercise antitrust authority over the banking sector in the 1950s.56 
Then, shortly after the passage of the Bank Merger Act, the Supreme Court 
held that—contrary to conventional wisdom—bank mergers were subject to 
both the Clayton and Sherman Acts.57 This surprising result created significant 
uncertainty within the banking sector.58 The Supreme Court’s rulings meant 
that even if the relevant banking agency approved a merger proposal under the 
Bank Merger Act, the DOJ could later challenge the transaction under the 
federal antitrust statutes.59 Thus, in the span of a decade, bank mergers went 
from being effectively unregulated to being subject to review by both the 
federal banking agencies and the DOJ. 
 
50. See Regulation of Bank Mergers: Hearing on S. 1062 Before the H. Comm. on Banking & 
Currency, 86th Cong. 2-3 (1960) (statement of Rep. Paul Brown). 
51. See Casson & Burrus, supra note 11, at 683. 
52. Bank Merger Act, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2018)). 
53. Id. For a discussion of the Federal Reserve’s role as a bank regulator, see PETER CONTI-
BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 158-75 (2016). 
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (2018). 
55. Regulation of Bank Mergers: Hearing on S. 1062 Before the S. Comm. on Banking & 
Currency, 86th Cong. 1 (1960) (statement of Sen. A. Willis Robertson). 
56. See Casson & Burrus, supra note 11, at 684-85. 
57. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 334, 335-49 (1963) (concluding that bank 
mergers are subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act); see also United States v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. 
of Lexington, 376 U.S. 655, 672-73 (1964) (holding that the challenged bank merger created an 
unreasonable restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
58. See Casson & Burrus, supra note 11, at 690; Lifland, supra note 11, at 28. 
59. The potential for ex post antitrust enforcement was uniquely burdensome for banks, which 
would face serious challenges reversing an already-consummated merger. See Casson & Burrus, supra 
note 11, at 690. 
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Congress promptly amended the Bank Merger Act to address the financial 
sector’s concerns about dual bank merger enforcement. The Bank Merger Act 
Amendments of 1966 established a revised regulatory framework for bank 
mergers that is still in effect today.60 
From an antitrust perspective, the 1966 amendments rationalized bank 
merger review in two ways. First, to enhance consistency between the banking 
agencies and the DOJ, the amendments require the banking agencies to analyze 
a merger’s potential anticompetitive effects under standards similar to the 
federal antitrust laws. Thus, the banking agencies are prohibited from 
approving “any proposed merger transaction which would result in a monopoly 
. . . in any part of the United States.”61 Likewise, the banking agencies may not 
approve a merger “whose effect in any section of the country may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”62 
Congress, however, provided an exception to this second standard: the agencies 
may approve a merger that substantially lessens competition or tends to create a 
monopoly if it finds that the anticompetitive effects “are clearly outweighed in 
the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the 
convenience and needs of the community to be served.”63 
The second way in which the 1966 amendments rationalized bank merger 
antitrust review is by preserving a modified role for the DOJ. The amendments 
direct the banking agencies to notify the DOJ of pending merger applications.64 
The DOJ, in turn, must provide the agencies with a “competitive factors” report 
within 30 days.65 In theory, this mandatory consultation helps resolve 
disagreements between the banking agencies and the DOJ before the agencies 
act on an application.66 The 1966 amendments, moreover, provide the DOJ a 
limited timeframe in which to challenge a merger on antitrust grounds. After 
the relevant banking agency approves a merger, the applicants must wait 30 
days before consummating the transaction.67 The DOJ may file a lawsuit 
seeking to block the proposed merger within that timeframe. After the 
 
60. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2018)). 
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(A) (2018). This rule resembles section 2 of the Sherman Act. See 
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2018). This standard resembles section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018). The Bank Merger Act also prohibits the agencies from approving a merger 
that “would be in restraint of trade,” similar to section 1 of the Sherman Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 
1828(c)(5)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
63. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2018). 
64. Id. § 1828(c)(4)(A). 
65. Id. § 1828(c)(4)(B)(i). The original Bank Merger Act also required the DOJ to furnish a 
competitive factors report to the relevant banking agency. See Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129, 129 
(1960). 
66. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4)(A) (2018) (noting that Congress required the DOJ competitive 
factors report “[i]n the interests of uniform standards”). 
67. Id. § 1828(c)(6). The waiting period may be shortened to 15 days if the DOJ does not 
submit an adverse competitive factors report to the relevant banking agency or to 5 days if the agency 
advises the DOJ of an emergency requiring expeditious action to prevent the probable failure of an 
insured depository institution. Id. 
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expiration of the 30 days, however, the merger is immune from antitrust 
challenge.68 By limiting the time period in which the DOJ may challenge a 
bank merger, Congress prevented the DOJ from seeking to reverse a bank 
merger after it has been completed. 
More broadly, the 1966 amendments enumerate two factors for the 
agencies to consider in addition to potential anticompetitive effects. These 
additional factors resemble the original Bank Merger Act. First, the 
amendments maintain the requirement that the agencies consider the 
“convenience and needs of the community to be served.”69 Although 
lawmakers recognized the potential ambiguity in this statutory language,70 a 
committee report accompanying the amendments clarified that “convenience 
and needs” generally refers to the banking system’s ability to “provide banking 
services essential to the full development of the economy, to full employment 
and full production.”71 Second, in a slight modification of the original Bank 
Merger Act, the amendments require the agencies to consider “the financial and 
managerial resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed 
institutions.”72 Critically, the amendments emphasize that the relevant agency 
must take these factors into account “in every case,” regardless of the 
competitive effects of the transaction.73 
In the decades following the Bank Merger Act amendments, Congress 
expanded the list of factors the agencies must consider when evaluating merger 
proposals. In 1977, for example, Congress adopted the CRA, which directs the 
agencies to take into account a merger applicant’s “record of meeting the credit 
needs of its entire community, including [LMI] neighborhoods.”74 In effect, the 
CRA requires the agencies to focus on a proposed merger’s effect on 
underserved populations, in addition to the convenience and needs of the 
broader community.75 Moreover, after the failure of numerous large banks 
during the 2008 financial crisis, Congress further amended the Bank Merger 
Act to require the agencies to consider systemic risk.76 Thus, the relevant 
agency must now take into account a proposed merger’s “risk to the stability of 
 
68. Id. § 1828(c)(7). 
69. Id. § 1828(c)(5). 
70. See 112 CONG. REC. 2,349 (1966) (statement of Rep. Ryan) (criticizing the convenience 
and needs factor as “vague and unfamiliar”); id. (statement of Rep. Todd) (noting that lawmakers had 
difficulty defining convenience and needs). 
71. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1179, at 5 (1965). 
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5). 
73. Id. 
74. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 804, 91 Stat. 1111, 1148 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (2018)). 
75. For a discussion of the relationship between the “convenience and needs” and CRA 
factors, see infra notes 263-265, 325 and accompanying text. 
76. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 604(f), 124 Stat. 1376, 1602 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (2018)). 
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the United States banking or financial system.”77 The Bank Merger Act, in 
sum, requires the agencies to consider a broad range of factors in addition to 
competition. 
Similar statutory standards apply to mergers and acquisitions by BHCs 
under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act).78 In the early twentieth 
century, numerous banks adopted a holding company structure to evade 
restrictions on interstate banking.79 Congress passed the BHC Act in 1956 to 
combat this practice.80 Today, the BHC Act subjects BHC mergers and 
acquisitions to pre-approval by the Federal Reserve using standards nearly 
identical to those in the Bank Merger Act.81 Although the precise language in 
the two statutes varies slightly, these differences are rarely consequential.82 
Unless otherwise specified, therefore, this Article refers to the BHC and Bank 
Merger Acts collectively as the “bank merger statutes.” 
In sum, federal regulation of bank mergers has expanded significantly 
during the past century. While bank consolidation was largely unregulated in 
the early twentieth century, modern banks and BHCs must now obtain pre-
approval from the appropriate federal regulator before merging. The bank 
merger statutes establish four wide-ranging factors that the agencies must take 
into account when evaluating a merger proposal: (1) potential anticompetitive 
effects, (2) risks to financial stability, (3) the convenience and needs of the 
community, including the applicant’s CRA performance, (4) and the firms’ 
financial and managerial resources. Despite these broad factors, however, 
policymakers and scholars have tended to focus narrowly on just one 
consideration—competition—as the next Section demonstrates. 
 
77. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5). In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 mandated that the 
agencies consider the merging banks’ effectiveness in combatting money laundering. See Pub. L. No. 
107-56, § 327, 115 Stat. 272, 318-19 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(11) (2018)). 
78. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-52 (2018)). 
79. As Professors Saule Omarova and Margaret Tahyar explained, “before the passage of the 
[BHC Act], banks could form or reincorporate themselves as holding companies and hold separately 
incorporated banks in different states to engage in interstate banking without running afoul of the then-
ubiquitous interstate banking restrictions.” Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We 
Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 121 (2012). 
80. See id. at 120-29. In addition to preventing the evasion of interstate banking restrictions—
which have since been repealed—the BHC Act also limits excessive concentration in banking and 
preserves the traditional separation of banking and commerce in the United States. See id. 
81. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2018). The BHC Act also requires Federal Reserve pre-approval 
for certain nonbank acquisitions by BHCs. See id. § 1843(j). Nonbank acquisitions are generally outside 
the scope of this Article. For a discussion of BHCs’ authority to engage in nonbanking activities, see 
Kress, supra note 4, at 183-85, 213-19. 
82. See infra note 204 (discussing minor differences between the BHC Act’s and Bank Merger 
Act’s financial stability standards). Modern bank deals often require parallel applications under both the 
BHC and Bank Merger Acts because they generally involve both holding-company-level acquisitions 
and the merger of subsidiary banks. See, e.g., Fifth Third Bancorp, 105 Fed. Res. Bull. 70, 75-82 (2019). 
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B. The Diminishing Relevance of Bank Antitrust 
As the preceding discussion suggests, antitrust considerations dominated 
early bank merger policy in the United States. That trend continued throughout 
the latter half of the twentieth century, when policymakers and scholars 
focused primarily on antitrust in bank merger oversight, to the exclusion of the 
other statutory factors. Over the past several decades, however, competitive 
considerations have become increasingly irrelevant in bank merger reviews due 
to recent regulatory and market developments. This Section examines how 
antitrust considerations originally dominated bank merger regulation but have 
since largely lost relevance. 
1. Early Focus on Competition 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, regulators routinely challenged bank 
mergers on competitive grounds. The Federal Reserve alone denied sixty-three 
merger applications because of antitrust concerns between 1972 and 1982.83 
Competitive considerations dominated merger oversight for each of the 
banking agencies. Indeed, a 1982 General Accounting Office analysis of the 
bank merger review process concluded that competition was the “area that 
receives the most consideration by the agencies and involves the most 
controversy.”84 Even when the banking agencies approved an application, the 
DOJ often sued to block a merger it deemed to be anticompetitive.85 Frequent 
litigation between the DOJ and the banking agencies led to a sizeable body of 
judicial precedent on competitive considerations in bank merger applications.86 
Informed by this early experience, the banking agencies and the DOJ 
developed a cooperative framework for analyzing competitive considerations in 
bank mergers. Under joint screening guidelines published in 1995, the banking 
agencies and DOJ rely on the HHI to flag potentially problematic merger 
proposals.87 The HHI is a widely recognized measure of market concentration 
calculated by summing the squared market share of every competitor in a 
market.88 The banking agencies and the DOJ state that they are unlikely to 
challenge a proposal if the post-merger HHI does not exceed 1,800 and the 
merger does not cause the HHI to increase by more than 200 points in any 
 
83. See SHULL & HANWECK, supra note 5, at 97. 
84. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-82-53, BANK MERGER PROCESS SHOULD BE 
MODERNIZED AND SIMPLIFIED 10 (1982), https://www.gao.gov/assets/140/138428.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SY9X-ZW6W]. 
85. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 116 (discussing early court battles between the DOJ and the 
banking regulators). 
86. See id. (noting numerous Supreme Court cases involving bank antitrust). 
87. See Bank Merger Guidelines, supra note 20, at 1-2. 
88. See Aaron C. Stine & Eric D. Gorman, Ebbing the Tide of Local Bank Concentration: 
Granting Sole Authority to the Department of Justice to Review the Competitive Effects of Bank 
Mergers, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 405, 416 n.56 (2012). 
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relevant banking market.89 For proposals that exceed these thresholds in a 
given market, the banking agencies and DOJ scrutinize potential competitive 
effects more closely and may ultimately deny or challenge the merger.90 The 
banking agencies and DOJ differ in how they apply the HHI screens; for 
example, they generally define the relevant product markets differently.91 The 
guidelines, however, provide a unified framework for competitive analysis in 
bank mergers. 
Consistent with regulators’ traditional emphasis on competitive factors, 
legal scholarship on bank mergers has focused almost exclusively on antitrust. 
Numerous law review articles in the 1960s analyzed the enactment of the Bank 
Merger Act and subsequent Supreme Court cases clarifying the application of 
the federal antitrust laws to bank mergers.92 Later scholarship focused on the 
framework for evaluating antitrust standards in banking—for example, the 
delineation of relevant product and geographic markets.93 Even after the 
financial crisis, legal scholars have continued to view bank consolidation 
primarily through the lens of antitrust.94 
While policymakers and scholars focused intently on competitive 
considerations in early bank mergers, they paid comparatively little attention to 
the bank merger statutes’ other factors. Few scholars, for example, even 
acknowledged considerations other than competition in bank merger 
applications until Congress adopted the CRA in 1977. Even then, scholarship 
on the CRA tended to focus on the theoretical basis for the law and its effect on 
LMI areas, rather than on the CRA’s role in bank merger applications.95 The 
banking agencies, moreover, deemphasized statutory factors other than 
competition throughout the 1980s. The agencies rarely addressed the 
convenience and needs or financial and managerial standards in their public 
orders on bank merger applications, other than to note that they were consistent 
 
89. See Bank Merger Guidelines, supra note 20, at 1-2. 
90. See id. at 3-4. 
91. The banking agencies traditionally define the relevant product market in bank mergers as 
the market for deposits, whereas the DOJ analyzes both deposit and commercial loan markets. See Stine 
& Gorman, supra note 88, at 416-17. 
92. See, e.g., Casson & Burrus, supra note 11; Klebaner, supra note 11; Lifland, supra note 
11; Mogel, supra note 11; Via, supra note 11; Wemple & Cutler, supra note 11. 
93. See, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 11; Cohen, supra note 11; Kintner & Hansen, supra note 
11; Kramer, supra note 11; Daniel J. Mahoney, “When Bank Mergers Meet Antitrust Law, There’s No 
Competition.” Why Antitrust Law Will Do Little to Prevent Overconsolidation Within the Banking 
Industry, 14 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 303 (1995); Roach, supra note 11. 
94. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1; Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons for Competition Law from 
the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the “Too Big to Fail” Phenomenon, 16 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261 (2011); Pekarek & Huth, supra note 19; Stine & Gorman, supra note 
88; Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Financial Regulation in the Wake of Philadelphia National Bank: 
Complements, Not Substitutes, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 413 (2015); Robert P. Zora, Note, The Bank Failure 
Crisis: Challenges in Enforcing Antitrust Regulation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1175 (2009). 
95. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An 
Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 340-41 (1993) (asserting that the CRA harms the very LMI 
areas it was designed to help by reducing the amount of available credit). 
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with approval.96 Even after the 2008 financial crisis and the addition of the 
financial stability factor, scholars paid little attention to how the agencies 
assess systemic risk in bank merger proposals.97 Thus, the bank merger 
statutes’ other factors have largely been met with indifference. 
In sum, the federal banking agencies have traditionally prioritized 
competitive considerations in bank merger applications. The DOJ, reviewing 
courts, and legal scholars have reinforced this emphasis through extensive 
critiques and analyses of the agencies’ approach to the antitrust factor. This 
near-exclusive focus on competitive considerations, however, effectively 
crowded out regulatory and scholarly attention to the bank merger statutes’ 
other considerations, which to date remain largely unexplored. 
2. The Declining Importance of Competition in Bank Merger Reviews 
Despite the initial emphasis policymakers and scholars placed on 
competitive considerations, antitrust has become increasingly irrelevant in bank 
merger applications over the past several decades. Compared to the 1960s and 
1970s, modern-day bank mergers are less likely to have significant 
anticompetitive effects as measured by the HHI. That is because two trends in 
bank regulation and market structure have substantially increased competition 
in many local banking markets and, as a result, rendered traditional bank 
antitrust functionally obsolete. 
First, liberalized geographic restrictions in the late twentieth century 
permitted banks to expand interstate for the first time, freeing firms to enter 
out-of-state banking markets that had long been insulated from competition. 
Historically, federal and state laws prohibited a bank from operating outside of 
its home state.98 In the 1970s, however, some states eased these geographic 
restrictions, permitting banks to branch and merge across state lines.99 It was 
not until 1994, though, that the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act (Riegle-Neal) eliminated the remaining barriers to interstate 
banking, thereby allowing banks to branch and merge without geographic 
restrictions.100 Since then, the advent of online banking has enabled firms to 
compete in areas where they do not have a physical presence.101 Although 
 
96. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 372 n.8 (“In the vast majority of the financial regulatory 
institutions’ orders on bank merger or acquisition applications . . . there is no discussion of the 
regulators’ analysis of the public-interest provision beyond a single reference to the fact that the 
regulator considered the issue.”). 
97. See Tarullo, supra note 13, at 19-20. 
98. See Kress, supra note 4, at 180-81. 
99. See id. at 181-82. 
100. Pub. L. No. 103-238, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. 
(2018)). 
101. See, e.g., Gabriel T. Rubin, Mobile Banking Grows More Popular, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mobile-banking-grows-more-popular-1459352120 
[https://perma.cc/YA7F-HU4Z]. 
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empirical evidence on bank concentration since Riegle-Neal is mixed,102 the 
relaxation of geographic restrictions has, at a minimum, increased potential 
competition in many local markets.103 
Second, the recent emergence of nonbank financial companies has 
enhanced competition for many financial products that were once exclusively 
offered by banks. Traditionally, banks were shielded from competition with 
savings and loan associations and credit unions under regulations that limited 
nonbank depository institutions’ product offerings and restricted their potential 
customer base.104 In the 1980s, however, policymakers began easing these 
constraints in an effort to enhance nonbank depository institutions’ 
profitability.105 This deregulatory trend has continued to the point that 
numerous savings and loan associations and credit unions now compete 
directly with banks under comparable regulatory regimes.106 The banking 
agencies now regularly take these nonbank depository institutions into account 
when performing HHI calculations.107 Moreover, at the same time that banks 
have faced increased competition from other depository institutions, non-
depository fintech companies have emerged as popular providers of loans, 
savings products, and investment advice.108 Many commenters have observed 
that fintech firms’ ability to serve traditional bank customers without a banking 
license and concomitant regulation poses a major competitive threat to 
banks.109 Thus, while banks previously were insulated from competition from 
 
102. On the national level, the U.S. banking market has become significantly more 
concentrated since the 1990s, with the five largest banks now comprising 46% of all bank assets, 
compared to 29% in 1997. See Econ. Research Div., 5-Bank Asset Concentration for United States, FED. 
RES. BANK SAINT LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDOI06USA156NWDB 
[https://perma.cc/C2CH-VJ4H]. This consolidation, however, is not reflected at the local level, where 
concentration levels have generally declined during this time. See Robert M. Adams, Consolidation and 
Merger Activity in the United States Banking Industry from 2000 to 2010, at 10, 14-15 (Fed. Reserve 
Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2012-51, 2012), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2193886 [https://perma.cc/5TLH-XP9J] (concluding that average local 
banking market concentration fell between 2000 and 2010 despite an increase in national banking 
concentration); see also Letter from Jerome H. Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., to Sen. Elizabeth Warren 5-6 (May 10, 2018) [hereinafter Powell Letter], 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Powell%20Response%20re%20Mergers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SBR5-9Y93] (noting that the average local banking market concentration declined or 
remained constant between 2006 and 2018 despite an increase in national banking concentration). 
103. See SHULL & HANWECK, supra note 5, at 93. 
104. See Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 79, at 174-88. 
105. See id. at 175, 180-81. 
106. See SHULL & HANWECK, supra note 5, at 92-93; see also Pekarek & Huth, supra note 19, 
at 631. 
107. See R. Alton Gilbert & Adam M. Zaretsky, Banking Antitrust: Are the Assumptions Still 
Valid?, FED. RES. BANK SAINT LOUIS REV., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 29, 31. 
108. See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 232, 238-42 (2018) (discussing the competitive challenges fintech poses to banking). 
109. See, e.g., Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 10-15), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3366016 [https://perma.cc/4LP9-V3H9] (discussing 
fintech business models); Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic 
Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 735, 782-86 (2019) (discussing the threat of fintech to bank lending). 
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outside the banking sector, nonbank entrants have substantially increased 
competition in the financial services marketplace. 
The competitive landscape in banking has changed so significantly in 
light of these trends that traditional antitrust concerns have become 
anachronistic. Antitrust used to be a significant worry in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when geographic restrictions and other barriers to entry shielded incumbent 
banks from competition. Today, however, numerous diversified financial 
conglomerates offer similar products and services through interstate branches 
and widely accessible electronic platforms. Meanwhile, the nascent fintech 
sector promises to continue challenging banks by giving consumers new 
options for obtaining financial services. Thus, while bank consolidation at the 
national level has increased over time, local market concentration has generally 
declined.110 Collectively, the elimination of competitive barriers and the 
emergence of new financial services providers have alleviated long-standing 
competitive concerns in local banking markets. 
In practice, competitive considerations are no longer a meaningful 
constraint on bank consolidation. After an initial torrent of antitrust-related 
denials in the 1970s, the banking agencies have not denied a bank merger 
application involving an institution with more than $1 million in assets on 
competitive grounds since 1980.111 The DOJ, meanwhile, has not challenged a 
bank merger since 1985.112 In part, this lack of antitrust enforcement is 
attributable to market participants’ understanding of the bank merger 
guidelines and their proactive planning to divest branches when a merger 
would exceed the applicable HHI thresholds.113 But the drastic reduction in 
antitrust enforcement also signifies that increased competition has rendered 
antitrust irrelevant in most bank merger applications.114 Several scholars have 
advanced proposals to revive antitrust considerations in bank merger reviews, 
suggesting that the current framework does not measure bank competition 
 
110. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
111. See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1391 (2011). 
112. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 116. Some commentators have criticized the DOJ for 
outsourcing bank merger analysis to the banking agencies. See, e.g., Stine & Gorman, supra note 88, at 
417 (characterizing the DOJ as a “junior partner” in the bank merger review process); Van Loo, supra 
note 108, at 264-65 (discussing DOJ’s reliance on the banking agencies); see also Samuel N. Weinstein, 
Financial Regulation in the (Receding) Shadow of Antitrust, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 447, 485-87 (2019) 
(contending that financial regulatory agencies are likely to be less effective antitrust enforcers relative to 
the DOJ). 
113. See SHULL & HANWECK, supra note 5, at 97; see also Regulated Industries, Hearing 
Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm’n 14 (Dec. 5, 2005) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General 
Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), 
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Alvarez_Statement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4MXX-VPX9]. 
114. See Pekarek & Huth, supra note 19, at 631-36 (asserting that the traditional approach to 
competition in bank merger review is outdated because banks are no longer insulated from competition). 
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appropriately.115 To date, however, policymakers have made no effort to 
reinvigorate antitrust enforcement as a significant constraint on bank mergers. 
In sum, after initially dominating the bank merger review process, 
antitrust has diminished in importance. For all the attention that policymakers, 
scholars, and courts paid to competitive considerations during the 1960s and 
1970s, recent changes in banking regulation and market composition mean that 
antitrust is now rarely relevant in bank merger applications. Due to their long-
standing focus on competition, meanwhile, both the banking agencies and 
academics have neglected the bank merger statutes’ other, equally important 
factors. By misplacing attention on increasingly irrelevant competitive 
considerations at the expense of financial stability, consumer protection, and 
other statutory factors, the banking agencies have undermined the efficacy of 
bank merger oversight. 
II. Weaknesses in Bank Merger Oversight 
As antitrust concerns have faded, the banking agencies have become a 
rubber stamp for merger proposals. Today, the banking agencies approve 
merger applications at historically high rates and in record-low time. This 
permissive approach is troubling in light of evidence that lax oversight of bank 
consolidation hurts consumers and could threaten financial stability. This Part 
examines the disturbing trend toward laissez faire merger regulation and the 
risks of unrestrained bank consolidation. 
A. The Trend Toward Permissive Bank Merger Approvals 
The regulatory agencies have become increasingly tolerant of bank 
mergers over time. While the agencies regularly denied merger applications in 
the 1970s and 1980s, they now approve nearly all filings. Today’s 
overwhelming approval rates are due, in part, to informal procedures that 
permit banks to consult confidentially with the agencies before executing a 
merger agreement. In practice, these secret conversations predispose regulators 
to approve a merger once an application is filed. This Section reviews the 
agencies’ exceptionally high merger approval rates and scrutinizes their 
procedures that tip the scales heavily in favor of continued consolidation. 
Historically, the banking agencies have always approved the majority of 
merger applications. Although data on early merger applications are limited, 
the available data suggest that approval rates hovered around 90% for much of 
the latter half of the twentieth century.116 Notwithstanding the agencies’ 
 
115. See, e.g., id. at 604 (proposing narrower product and broader geographic market 
definitions); Van Loo, supra note 108, at 271-75 (suggesting the CFPB as a new competition enforcer). 
116. See Watson, supra note 11, at 85 n.37 (noting that the agencies approved 90% of bank 
mergers between 1960 and 1965); see also Michael A. Jessee & Steven A. Seelig, An Analysis of the 
Public Benefits Test of the Bank Holding Company Act, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. MONTHLY REV., June 
1974, at 159 (noting that the Federal Reserve approved 90% of BHC applications in the 1970s). 
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generally favorable disposition toward mergers, however, the agencies 
regularly denied applications during this time. Between 1960 and 1965, for 
example, the agencies formally rejected thirty-one applications.117 As discussed 
above, the Federal Reserve denied sixty-three applications between 1972 and 
1982 on competitive grounds alone.118 Thus, although the agencies have 
historically acted favorably on merger applications, they regularly denied 
merger proposals when necessary to curb potentially harmful consolidation in 
the banking sector. 
Over time, however, the agencies’ approach to merger applications has 
become even more favorable to banks in two critical ways. First, the agencies’ 
approval rates have reached record highs. The Federal Reserve recently began 
releasing comprehensive data on merger applications beginning in 2011. The 
data, reproduced in Table 1, reveal that the Federal Reserve initially cracked 
down on bank consolidation after the financial crisis, with approval rates 
falling to around 80%.119 More recently, however, approval rates have climbed 
steadily, exceeding the historical average and reaching a peak of 95% in 2018. 
The Federal Reserve is also approving these proposals with record speed.120 In 
the past, the Federal Reserve has taken nearly a year, on average, to consider 
merger proposals that attracted adverse public comment. In 2018, it approved 
such proposals in an average of four months. 
 
 
117. See Hearings on S. 1698 Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Fin. of the S. Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 89th Cong. 15 (1965) (statement of William Martin, Chairman, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
118. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
119. Data for Table 1 are collected from SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON BANKING APPLICATIONS—
YEAR-END 2018, supra note 14, at 3-4, and BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 2 
SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON BANKING APPLICATIONS ACTIVITY: JULY 1–DECEMBER 31, 2014, at 3-4 
(2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/201504-semiannual-report-on-banking-
applications-activity.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN57-4Y7T]. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has 
suggested that the decline in the approval rate in the years following the financial crisis was attributable 
to numerous applicants withdrawing their filings when they were not the winning bidder for a failed 
bank in an FDIC liquidation process. See Powell Letter, supra note 102, at 7. 
120. See Lalita Clozel, Bank Mergers Get Faster Under Trump, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bank-mergers-get-faster-under-trump-11550059200 
[https://perma.cc/8SFU-NRHM]. 
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Table 1: Federal Reserve Merger and Acquisition Applications (2011-
2018) 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Approved 194 226 190 248 279 245 238 190 
Withdrawn 43 43 40 25 21 28 15 10 
% Approved 82% 84% 83% 91% 93% 90% 94% 95% 
Average 






212 283 203 209 297 159 173 113 
 
The second way in which the agencies have encouraged consolidation is 
by manipulating their application procedures to cater to the banking sector. In 
the late 1990s, the agencies effectively stopped denying merger applications. 
Instead, when an agency discovers a problem with a merger proposal, it now 
informs the applicant of the issue and gives the bank an opportunity to 
withdraw its application.121 A voluntary withdrawal shields the bank from bad 
publicity and the negative market reaction a public denial might cause.122 This 
informal process, however, leaves no publicly available, written record of the 
deficiencies in the merger proposal. The Federal Reserve has now approved 
3,506 merger applications since 2006 without issuing a single denial.123 
The most significant end-run around the application process, however, 
occurs before a bank even executes a merger agreement. It is now common 
practice for the banking agencies to allow firms to vet potential deals 
confidentially before announcing a merger.124 In these private meetings, a bank 
may ask regulators whether they foresee potential barriers to approval of a 
 
121. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., APPLICATIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL § 1.3-1 (2019) 
(noting that applicants may be offered the opportunity to withdraw a problematic filing at the FDIC’s 
discretion). 
122. See Kress, supra note 14. 
123. See Powell Letter, supra note 102, at 3 (noting that the Federal Reserve approved 3,316 
mer nnger applications between 2006 and 2017 without a single denial); see also SEMIANNUAL REPORT 
ON BANKING APPLICATIONS—YEAR-END 2018, supra note 14, at 3-4 (noting that the Federal Reserve 
approved 190 merger applications and denied zero in 2018). 
124. See Kress, supra note 14; see also Alvarez, supra note 113, at 14 (“[S]taffs of the Board 
and Reserve Banks often provide guidance to [BHCs] and banks that are considering a merger prior to 
the filing of an application . . . .”). 
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transaction.125 If regulators raise a concern about a proposal, the bank might not 
pursue the merger. But when regulators express no reservations, the bank may 
enter into a merger agreement with the agencies’ implicit blessing.126 Federal 
Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has acknowledged that these private 
conversations occur.127 Meanwhile, BB&T CEO Kelly King admitted that 
regulators told him there would be no barriers to his company’s merger with 
SunTrust.128 The agencies, in sum, cater to banks by permitting them to pre-
screen their merger proposals outside of the formal application process. 
These unorthodox procedures undermine bank merger reviews in three 
ways. First, the confidential pre-screening of proposals and the absence of 
formal denials decrease transparency in the application process. The agencies 
have recently enhanced transparency in many areas, including monetary 
policy,129 bank supervision,130 and financial stability monitoring.131 At the same 
time, however, the agencies have obscured the bank merger review process by 
permitting confidential pre-screening and ceasing to issue formal denials. This 
opacity impedes the public’s understanding of the application process and 
could prevent interested parties from offering valuable perspective on merger 
proposals.132 
Second, pre-vetting of potential mergers predisposes regulators to approve 
an application when one is ultimately filed. Due to several cognitive biases, 
regulators are reluctant to change their minds after initially giving a bank the 
 
125. These meetings differ from a pre-filing process, in which some agencies allow potential 
applicants to file a draft application and obtain feedback from staff. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 12-12, IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW PROCESS FOR REQUESTING GUIDANCE 
FROM THE FEDERAL RESERVE REGARDING BANK AND NONBANK ACQUISITIONS AND OTHER 
PROPOSALS (2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
supervisionreg/srletters/sr1212.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV7A-UKPE]. The pre-filing process is typically 
limited to small firms that do not usually file merger applications, while bigger banks use informal 
conversations to vet proposals with the agencies. See id. at 2. 
126. See Kress, supra note 14. 
127. See Powell Letter, supra note 102, at 3. 
128. Paul Davis, Truist Rising: With Megamerger Done, Pressure on to Deliver, AM. BANKER 
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/truist-rising-with-megamerger-done-pressure-
on-to-deliver [https://perma.cc/64HD-8DDV] (“I was told by several senior regulators there was no 
legal reason to object to the deal.” (quoting BB&T CEO Kelly King)). King described the bank merger 
approval process as “basically frictionless.” Id. 
129. See Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at 
Society of American Business Editors and Writers 50th Anniversary Conference:  Communication in 
Monetary Policy 3-9 (Apr. 4, 2013), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/yellen20130404a.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZGH-
PBKU]. 
130. See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Chairman McWilliams Announces 
Transparency and Accountability Initiative (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2018/pr18069.pdf [https://perma.cc/S692-E885]. 
131. See Jerome H. Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at 
350 Years of Central Banking Conference: Financial Stability and Central Bank Transparency 4-6 (May 
25, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/powell20180525a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2Q3-4B9E]. 
132. See Brian Cheung, Warren Accuses Fed of Approving Bank Mergers with “Rubber 
Stamp,” YAHOO FIN. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/elizabeth-warren-fed-chair-
powell-140135534.html [https://perma.cc/NJK3-EGMB]. 
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go-ahead to enter a merger agreement. Under the consistency principle, for 
example, people tend to conform their behavior to maintain consistency with 
their prior actions and statements.133 Similarly, confirmation bias causes people 
to accept data that supports their beliefs and discount information that 
contradicts them.134 Thus, even though agencies eventually solicit public 
comment on merger applications after they are formally filed, regulators are 
highly unlikely to change their minds because of these cognitive biases.135 In 
this way, pre-screening of a potential merger greases the wheels and creates 
internal momentum within a regulatory agency. After regulators give a bank 
the green light to announce an acquisition, the deal becomes difficult to stop. 
Finally, because the agencies have stopped denying merger proposals, 
they have effectively excluded the judiciary from the merger review process. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, courts exerted significant influence over bank merger 
regulation in light of frequent litigation among the banking agencies, the DOJ, 
and merger applicants concerning the disposition of merger applications.136 The 
judiciary, for example, helped shape the geographic and product market 
definitions the agencies now use for competitive analysis.137 Since the agencies 
have stopped denying merger applications, however, “the judiciary has not had 
an opportunity to review the policy it was instrumental in establishing . . . since 
the early 1980s.”138 Today, the agencies’ merger decisions are effectively 
immune from judicial review because they no longer issue formal denials, and 
the public generally lacks standing to challenge merger approvals.139 Excluding 
the judiciary in this way reduces the agencies’ accountability and allows the 
merger review process to atrophy without appropriate oversight. 
Collectively, these practices have weakened merger regulation and 
resulted in more permissive merger approvals. By refusing to deny problematic 
merger proposals and permitting banks to screen potential mergers in advance 
of filing an application, the agencies bias the review process in favor of 
continued consolidation. As one might expect given these biases, the agencies 
now speedily approve a record proportion of merger applications. This trend 
 
133. See generally ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 57-
113 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the consistency principle). 
134. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds, NEW YORKER (Feb. 27, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-our-minds 
[https://perma.cc/ML8L-PRLE]. 
135. As Professor Terri Freidline and coauthors have asserted, federal bank regulators often 
overvalue positive comments and undervalue negative comments on bank mergers. See Terri Friedline 
et al., The Promises and Perils of Community Benefits Agreements: Evidence from Public Comments to 
a Large Bank Merger 11-19 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
136. See SHULL & HANWECK, supra note 5, at 98-100. 
137. See id. 
138. Id. 
139. See id. at 99 (noting that an agency’s request that a bank voluntarily withdraw its 
application is not a final judgment and is therefore unreviewable); Wilson, supra note 28, at 365 
(discussing precedent denying consumers standing to challenge bank merger approvals). 
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toward permissive bank merger review is especially troubling given mounting 
evidence that bank mergers can be detrimental, as the next Section documents. 
B. The Risks of Lenient Bank Merger Oversight 
Without appropriate regulation, bank mergers can harm consumers and 
increase systemic risks. Indeed, the weight of the empirical evidence suggests 
bank mergers generally reduce the availability and increase the cost of credit, 
with LMI areas and small businesses being particularly hard hit. Moreover, 
consolidation among larger banks intensifies risks to financial stability, yet 
often does not provide promised efficiency gains. This Section reviews 
research on the effects of bank mergers and concludes that the agencies’ laissez 
faire approach to bank consolidation increases risks to consumers and the 
financial system. 
Lax oversight of bank mergers often results in higher costs and greater 
inconvenience for consumers. Notwithstanding the trend toward heightened 
competition in the banking sector,140 empirical research demonstrates that 
mergers still increase the price of credit for many borrowers.141 At the same 
time, mergers tend to inflate the fees that banks charge consumers to maintain 
deposit accounts and depress the interest rates that banks pay to those 
accountholders.142 Meanwhile, bank consolidation typically leads to branch 
closures, inconveniencing customers who rely on proximity to branch 
offices.143 Without appropriate oversight, therefore, bank mergers can be 
detrimental to customers in numerous ways. 
The negative effects of bank mergers are often especially severe for LMI 
communities. Branch closures following a merger are typically concentrated in 
LMI areas.144 High-fee check-cashing companies and other predatory financial 
service providers tend to proliferate in LMI areas affected by bank mergers.145 
When banks merge, households in LMI neighborhoods are more likely to have 
 
140. See supra Section I.B.2. 
141. See, e.g., Mark J. Garmaise & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real 
and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition, 61 J. FIN. 495, 509-14 (2006) (finding that mergers 
among banks with at least $1 billion in assets between 1992 and 1999 increased interest rates on loans). 
142. See Robin A. Prager & Timothy H. Hannan, Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers 
Generate Significant Price Effects? Evidence from the Banking Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 433, 442-
449 (concluding that deposit rates offered by banks that merged between 1991 and 1994 declined 
relative to those offered by non-merging banks); Vitaly M. Bord, Bank Consolidation and Financial 
Inclusion: The Adverse Effects of Bank Mergers on Depositors 6-9 (Dec. 1, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/vbord/files/vbord_-_bank_consolidation_and_financial_
inclusion_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G6V-Y76B] (finding significant increases in account fees 
following acquisitions of banks with less than $10 billion in assets by banks with more than $10 billion 
in assets between 1994 and 2016). 
143. See Nguyen, supra note 25, at 15-17; DePillis, supra note 25. 
144. See GARY A. DYMSKI, THE BANK MERGER WAVE: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL CONSOLIDATION 95 (1999) (noting that post-merger branch closures are 
typically spread evenly among LMI and upper-income areas, but LMI areas are hit harder because they 
have fewer branches per capita to begin with). 
145. See Bord, supra note 142, at 23-25. 
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debts sent to collection agencies and experience evictions.146 The detrimental 
effects of bank mergers on LMI communities are particularly pronounced when 
the acquiring bank is large and headquartered out-of-state.147 Bank mergers are 
even associated with increases in burglary and other property crimes, with the 
largest effects in LMI areas.148 
Small businesses also bear the brunt of a laissez faire approach to bank 
mergers. Numerous empirical studies have shown that small businesses credit 
availability drops following bank consolidations.149 For small businesses that 
are able to obtain loans, the cost of credit increases, while loan sizes shrink.150 
As a result, when banks merge, fewer small businesses are formed.151 This 
reduction in small business lending and formation, meanwhile, has knock-on 
effects for economic development. Research has found, for example, that bank 
mergers are associated with decreases in commercial real estate development, 
new construction activity, and local property prices.152 Meanwhile, in areas 
affected by bank mergers, unemployment increases, median income declines, 
and income inequality becomes more severe.153 Weak bank merger oversight, 
therefore, adversely impacts not only small businesses, but by extension, the 
general social welfare.154 
 
146. See id. at 30-32 (finding that bank mergers caused 9,000 evictions in LMI areas between 
2009 and 2012). 
147. See DYMSKI, supra note 144, at 249-50 (concluding that large acquirers without local 
branches perform poorly in lending to LMI areas). 
148. See Garmaise & Moskowitz, supra note 141, at 518-23. 
149. See, e.g., Allen N. Berger et al., The Effects of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions on Small 
Business Lending, 50 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 217, 222 (1998) (finding that mergers involving large banks 
between 1977 and 1992 were associated with decreases in small business lending); Steven G. Craig & 
Pauline Hardee, The Impact of Bank Consolidation on Small Business Credit Availability, 31 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1237, 1248-58 (2007) (concluding that bank consolidation has reduced credit 
availability for small businesses); Paola Sapienza, The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts, 
68 J. FIN. 329, 364 (2002) (finding that acquisitions by large banks decrease the supply of loans to small 
businesses). The detrimental effects on small business lending are particularly severe when a community 
bank merges with a nonlocal acquirer. See Julapa Jagtiani & Raman Quinn Maingi, How Important Are 
Local Community Banks to Small Business Lending? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions 18-20 
(Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 18-18), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-
/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2018/wp18-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2X7-
HS53]. 
150. See Garmaise & Moskowitz, supra note 141, at 515 (concluding that bank mergers 
between 1995 and 1997 significantly increased the cost of commercial credit and decreased loan size); 
Sapienza, supra note 149, at 354 (finding that acquisitions by large banks increase the cost of credit for 
small businesses). 
151. See Bill Francis et al., Bank Consolidation and New Business Formation, 32 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 1598, 1603-09 (2008). 
152. See Garmaise & Moskowitz, supra note 141, at 516-17. 
153. See id. at 518. 
154. To be sure, some detrimental effects of bank mergers are temporary and diminish over 
time as the competitive marketplace equilibrates. Some research, for example, documents that credit 
availability and interest rates mostly normalize three years following a merger. See id. at 514-15 
(finding that the impact of mergers on local banking markets lasts approximately three years); see also 
Dario Focarelli & Fabio Panetta, Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? Evidence from the Market for 
Bank Deposits, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1152, 1166 (finding that large Italian bank mergers between 1990 
and 1998 temporarily depressed interest rates on deposit accounts, but this effect disappears after three 
years). Importantly, however, these studies generally conclude that the negative effects of bank 
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In addition to harming consumers, lax bank merger oversight increases 
risks to financial stability. The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated 
unequivocally that large financial institutions can pose a threat to the financial 
system.155 This intuitive conclusion is supported by empirical evidence.156 
Bank mergers are a critical driver of increases in systemic risk. Indeed, mergers 
by Bank of America, JPMorgan, and Citigroup in the lead-up to the crisis 
allowed them to attain “too big to fail” status.157 By most accounts, 
consolidation among regional and super-regional banks continues to contribute 
to financial stability risks.158 Weak bank merger regulation, therefore, not only 
hurts consumers, it could imperil the broader financial system.159 
Moreover, bank mergers can pose serious integration risks. Integration 
challenges have disrupted numerous financial sector mergers, including Bank 
of New England’s repeated acquisitions in the 1980s and the infamous 
Citicorp-Travelers merger in the late 1990s.160 These disruptions can harm not 
 
consolidation never completely disappear, even after other firms adapt. See, e.g., Berger et al., supra 
note 149, at 212-13 (showing that the reactions of other banks only partially offset the post-merger 
reduction in small business lending after three years); Craig & Hardee, supra note 149, at 1254-58 
(concluding that nonbanks make up much, but not all, of the decline in small business lending when 
banks merge). But see Garmaise & Moskowitz, supra note 141, at 515 (finding that credit supply and 
pricing returns to normal three years after a merger). Moreover, for small businesses and other potential 
borrowers who require loans, even a relatively short disruption in credit markets following a merger can 
be costly. 
155. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 994 (2009) (discussing 
the role of financial conglomerates in the financial crisis). 
156. See, e.g., Simone Varotto & Lei Zhao, Systemic Risk and Bank Size, 82 J. INT’L MONEY 
& FIN. 45, 53-54 (2018) (concluding that a bank’s size, while not determinative, is the primary driver of 
its systemic riskiness). 
157. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
158. See Weiss et al., supra note 21, at 174-77 (finding a significant increase in the post-
merger systemic risk of consolidating banks and their competitors); see also Andre Uhde & Ulrich 
Heimeshoff, Consolidation in Banking and Financial Stability in Europe: Empirical Evidence, 33 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1299, 1305-10 (2009) (concluding that national banking market concentration has a 
negative effect on financial stability). 
159. Some financial sector representatives contend that consolidation among regional banks 
enhances financial stability by creating viable competitors to JPMorgan, Citigroup, Bank of America, 
and Wells Fargo. See, e.g., BB&T CORP., APPLICATION TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FOR PRIOR APPROVAL TO ACQUIRE BY MERGER SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. 
AND SUNTRUST BANK HOLDING CO. 35, 42 (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/files/Application-by-BBT-Corporation-to-Acquire-
SunTrust%20Banks-Inc-Pursuant-to%20Sections-3(a)(3)-and-(a)(5)-of-BHC-20190308.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CWX3-VYDK]. There is scant empirical evidence for this assertion, however. 
Moreover, creating more big banks via merger seems to be an odd strategy to combat systemic risks 
arising from the largest institutions. If policymakers are concerned that the four biggest banks are threats 
to financial stability, the most logical response is to break them up or otherwise shrink them—not to 
encourage growth among their competitors. For a discussion of policy options to break up the largest 
banks, see Kress, supra note 4, at 29-37, 40-43, 50-52. 
160. See Wilmarth, supra note 23, at 1010-12 (discussing Bank of New England’s failure 
following numerous acquisitions); Eric Dash, A Stormy Decade for Citi Since Travelers Merger N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/ 
business/03citi.html [https://perma.cc/3QF2-RFYB]; see also STEVEN I. DAVIS, BANK MERGERS: 
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 73-81 (2000) (discussing cultural conflicts in bank mergers); INGO WALTER, 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN BANKING AND FINANCE: WHAT WORKS, WHAT FAILS, AND WHY 129-
52 (2004) (discussing the post-merger challenge of integrating information technology). 
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only the banks themselves, but also their customers, communities, and 
employees.161 
All of this is not to say that bank mergers are per se problematic. In some 
cases, mergers can create cost savings, which banks might pass along to 
consumers. Indeed, according to several empirical studies, banks experience 
economies of scale.162 Moreover, scale has become even more important in 
recent years, as banks invest heavily in technology.163 Consistent with this 
intuition, a few studies have found that mergers—particularly those among the 
smallest banks—generate some cost savings.164 And, merging banks appear to 
pass at least part of these savings along to consumers in the form of lower 
interest rates on or wider availability of commercial loans.165 With appropriate 
oversight, therefore, bank mergers can benefit the institutions themselves and 
their customers. 
In many cases, however, banks vastly overstate the purported benefits of 
merging. Indeed, numerous studies contest the existence of economies of scale 
in banking entirely.166 The weight of the empirical evidence suggests that any 
 
161. See, e.g., Lee Schafer, Wells Fargo Fiasco Had Roots in Norwest Strategy, STAR 
TRIBUNE (Sept. 18, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/lee-schafer-wells-fargo-fiasco-had-roots-in-
norwest-strategy/393750451 [https://perma.cc/L5EA-2GS5] (describing how Wells Fargo’s merger with 
Norwest contributed to the scale of Wells Fargo’s subsequent scandals). 
162. See, e.g., Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, Who Said Large Banks Don’t 
Experience Scale Economies? Evidence from a Risk-Return-Driven Cost Function, 22 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 559, 581-82 (2013) (finding evidence of scale economies in BHCs with more than 
$100 billion in assets); Anna Kovner et al., Do Big Banks Have Lower Operating Costs?, 20 FED. 
RESERVE BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 22 (2014) (finding an inverse relationship between U.S. 
BHC asset size and noninterest expense ratios, suggesting economies of scale); Diego Restrepo-Tobón 
et al., Obelix vs. Asterix: Size of US Commercial Banks and Its Regulatory Challenge, 48 J. REG. ECON. 
125, 160 (2015) (concluding that most U.S. commercial banks with more than $1 billion in assets 
experience economies of scale); David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, The Evolution of Scale 
Economies in US Banking, 33 J. APPLIED ECON. 16, 23-27 (2018) (finding that U.S. BHCs experienced 
increasing returns to scale between 2006 and 2015). 
163. See Mike Dionne, More Regional Banks May Merge to Meet Tech Challenges, AM. 
BANKER (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/regional-banks-must-merge-to-
meet-tech-challenges [https://perma.cc/6ZNK-XA5W]. 
164. See, e.g., John H. Boyd & Stanley L. Graham, Consolidation in U.S. Banking: 
Implications for Efficiency and Risk, in BANK MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 113, 125-33 (Yakov 
Amihud & Geoffrey Miller eds., 1998) (concluding that mergers resulting in banks with less than $400 
million in assets yielded efficiency gains); Adel A. Al-Sharkas et al., The Impact of Mergers and 
Acquisitions of the US Banking Industry: Further Evidence, 35 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 50, 62-64 (2008) 
(finding that mergers in which small banks are involved result in bigger improvements in cost efficiency 
compared to larger bank mergers). 
165. See Isil Erel, The Effect of Bank Mergers on Loan Prices: Evidence from the United 
States, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1068, 1077-86 (2011) (concluding that an acquiring bank typically reduces 
spreads on commercial and industrial loans, as long as the merger does not significantly increase market 
concentration); see also Ricardo Correa, Bank Integration and Financial Constraints: Evidence from 
U.S. Firms 19-22 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion Paper No. 925, 
2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
pubs/ifdp/2008/925/ifdp925.pdf [https://perma.cc/QYB5-QSVW] (finding that U.S. bank mergers 
increased the availability of commercial credit between 1978 and 1994). 
166. See Hulusi Inanoglu et al., Analyzing Bank Efficiency: Are “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks 
Efficient?, in THE HANDBOOK OF POST CRISIS FINANCIAL MODELING 110, 113 (Emmanuel Haven et al. 
eds., 2016) (finding negative returns to scale among the fifty largest U.S. commercial banks); Richard 
Davies & Belinda Tracey, Too Big to Be Efficient? The Impact of Implicit Subsidies on Estimates of 
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efficiencies from large bank mergers derive from implicit “too big to fail” 
subsidies, rather than any actual cost savings.167 Ignoring these implicit 
subsidies, bank mergers produce often little or no cost efficiencies.168 Despite 
dubious benefits and significant risks of consolidation, however, bank 
executives nonetheless continue to pursue mergers to grow market share, 
increase their own compensation, and entrench themselves in their positions.169 
In sum, although bank mergers are not per se problematic, lenient bank 
merger oversight can expose consumers and the financial system to serious 
risks. Absent appropriate oversight, bank mergers often hurt consumers and 
increase systemic risks, without producing societal benefits. The cautionary 
evidence cited above suggests that regulators should more carefully scrutinize 
merger proposals—and reject or attach conditions to potentially harmful 
combinations. Yet the agencies’ recent track record indicates that they 
generally ignore the downsides of bank consolidation. Under their current 
laissez faire approach, the agencies deemphasize issues like financial stability, 
the convenience and needs of the community, and the future prospects of the 
institutions. Reviving these long-neglected factors is critical to protecting the 
public from the risks of unrestrained bank consolidation. 
III. The Case for Broader Bank Merger Regulation 
The adverse consequences of excessive bank consolidation underscore the 
need for bank merger regulation that emphasizes factors other than 
competition. As a practical matter, a more expansive approach is necessary 
because traditional competitive analysis is limited in its ability to protect 
consumers from higher prices and lower availability of financial services. Even 
if competitive analysis could safeguard customers from these adverse effects, 
however, it would still be appropriate for regulators to consider factors in 
 
Scale Economies for Banks, 46 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 219, 243-44 (2014) (finding no evidence 
of economies of scale in BHCs with more than $50 billion in assets after controlling for the too-big-to-
fail subsidy); Guohua Feng & Xiaohui Zhang, Returns to Scale at Large Banks in the US: A Random 
Coefficient Stochastic Frontier Approach, 39 J. BANKING & FIN. 135, 144 (2014) (concluding that 90% 
of U.S. commercial banks with more than $1 billion in assets do not experience economies of scale). 
167. See Erik Devos et al., supra note 23, at 1029 (finding that merger-related efficiency gains 
disappear when the acquirer exceeds $150 billion in assets); Robert DeYoung et al., Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Financial Institutions: A Review of the Post-2000 Literature, 36 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 87, 
96-97 (2009) (concluding that efficiency gains in large bank mergers derive from “too big to fail” 
subsidies rather than genuine cost savings). 
168. See, e.g., Berger et al., supra note 149, at 162 (“The studies of U.S. banking generally 
show very little or no cost X-efficiency improvement on average from . . . M&A.”); Stephen A. Rhoads, 
Efficiency Effects of Horizontal (In-Market) Bank Mergers, 17 J. BANKING & FIN. 411, 419-22 (1993) 
(concluding that bank mergers in the 1980s generally did not result in efficiency gains); see also Allen 
N. Berger & David B. Humphrey, Megamergers in Banking and the Use of Cost Efficiency as an 
Antitrust Defense, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 589, 598 (1992) (concluding that sample of bank mergers in the 
1980s resulted in cost inefficiencies). 
169. See Wilmarth, supra note 23, at 1013-15; see also Zhian Chen et al., The Impact of Bank 
Merger Growth on CEO Compensation, 44 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1398, 1415 (2017) (concluding that 
CEO compensation is positively correlated with merger growth); DeYoung et al., supra note 167, at 87. 
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addition to competition in order to achieve other important objectives of 
financial regulation. This Part explains why Congress was correct to include 
factors other than competition in the bank merger statutes and why it is critical 
that the agencies evaluate these criteria more stringently than they have in the 
past. 
A. Competitive Considerations Alone Cannot Prevent Adverse Consequences of 
Bank Mergers 
It is imperative that regulators broaden their approach to bank mergers 
because competitive analysis, on its own, is insufficient to address the risks of 
excessive bank consolidation. The agencies’ traditional focus on competitive 
considerations has not even served its primary goal of limiting price increases 
and preserving access to credit, as Section II.B demonstrated.170 Moreover, the 
competitive analysis is not well suited to address other drawbacks of 
consolidation, such as elevated financial stability risks. 
There are several possible explanations why traditional competitive 
analysis has not adequately protected consumers from higher costs and reduced 
availability of financial services. For one, because the banking agencies define 
the relevant product market as the full “cluster” of commercial banking 
services, they might fail to detect anticompetitive effects in certain submarkets, 
such as small business loans.171 Moreover, several commenters have suggested 
that the Bank Merger Guidelines’ 1,800/200 HHI threshold is too high and 
permits some mergers that could result in anticompetitive effects.172 Finally, 
regulators often make exceptions to the Bank Merger Guidelines and approve 
transactions that exceed the 1,800/200 threshold in one or more geographic 
markets.173 Taken together, these weaknesses suggest that regulators’ current 
approach to antitrust analysis may be too lenient to preserve robust 
competition. 
Although strengthening the competitive analysis could help mitigate the 
adverse consequences, it is unlikely that a more robust antitrust approach, in 
isolation, will adequately protect consumers. Indeed, the traditional HHI 
framework is simply not well suited to detect some anticompetitive effects. For 
example, nascent empirical scholarship suggests that large asset managers’ 
common ownership of banks is associated with higher prices and fees in a way 
that is unobservable by traditional HHI analysis.174 The current bank merger 
 
170. See supra notes 140-154 and accompanying text. 
171. See, e.g., William F. Jung, Note, Banking Mergers and ‘Line of Commerce’ After the 
Monetary Control Act: A Submarket Approach, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 731, 765-73; McCarthy, supra note 
11, at 887-88; Stine & Gorman, supra note 88, at 418-20. 
172. See, e.g., SHULL & HANWECK, supra note 5, at 194. 
173. See id. at 97. 
174. See Jose Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition 34-35 (May 4, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 [https://perma.cc/P9YA-PSX6]; cf. Yesha 
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review process—which is predicated on the HHI—is thus unequipped to assess 
how common ownership might aggravate a merger’s anticompetitive effects. 
Moreover, as former Federal Reserve Governor Jeremy Stein and coauthors 
have observed, a narrow focus on HHI obscures the mix of large and small 
banks remaining in a market after a merger.175 Because smaller banks tend to 
excel at serving the credit needs of local businesses, large bank acquisitions of 
small firms often hurt customers even when the HHI does not indicate a 
problem.176 These considerations may help explain why rapid bank 
consolidation in the past several decades has generally not led to higher local 
market HHIs,177 but it has resulted in increased prices and reduced availability 
of credit for consumers.178 
Furthermore, traditional competitive analysis is unable to address other 
downsides of bank consolidation, such as systemic risk. Some commentators 
have urged the banking agencies and the DOJ to use the federal antitrust laws 
to limit the size of “too big to fail” banks.179 The competitive analysis in bank 
merger applications, however, is not designed for this purpose.180 The bank 
merger statutes’ antitrust factor focuses on preserving competition within local 
banking markets—not on limiting a bank’s overall size or its nationwide 
market share.181 Moreover, even if the banking agencies or DOJ were to 
consider nationwide market concentration, it is unlikely that the current U.S. 
market structure—with four major competitors—would support limits on bank 
size based on competitive considerations alone.182 Finally, even if the agencies 
were to take into account nationwide HHI in an effort to alleviate the “too big 
to fail” problem, this simple size metric ignores other important contributors to 
a firm’s systemic risk, such as its complexity and interconnectedness.183 In 
sum, despite some exhortations to the contrary, the competitive analysis in 
bank merger applications is not well suited to address the risks of “too big to 
fail” banks. 
 
Yadav, Too-Big-To-Fail Shareholders, 103 MINN. L. REV. 587, 656-57 (2018) (discussing the role of 
large asset managers in bank governance). 
175. See Allen N. Berger et al., Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from 
the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 266 (2005). 
176. See id. 
177. See supra note 102. 
178. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text. 
179. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 94, at 269, 305-11; Zora, supra note 94, at 1192-94. 
180. To his credit, Professor Markham acknowledges that antitrust alone “can come nowhere 
near solving [the too-big-to-fail problem] or preventing recurrences of recent systemic failures.” 
Markham, supra note 94, at 261. 
181. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(5), 1842(c)(1) (2018). 
182. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1, at 370 (“[L]ooking back at the merger transactions that 
have created the largest financial institutions . . . I find it quite improbable that the DOJ could have 
mounted an antitrust enforcement program that could have had any serious impact on the major 
expansions in size of the largest [BHCs].”). 
183. See OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, SIZE ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO IDENTIFY 
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS 1-2 (2017), https://www.financialresearch.gov/ 
viewpoint-papers/files/OFRvp_17-04_Systemically-Important-Banks.pdf [https://perma.cc/5R9D-
K7CE]. 
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The foregoing discussion helps explain why the agencies should broaden 
their bank merger analyses beyond their longstanding focus on competition. 
Traditional HHI metrics suggest that local banking markets generally remain 
competitive, yet bank mergers continue to result in higher costs and lower 
availability of financial services, particularly for LMI communities.184 
Moreover, competitive analysis is poorly suited to address financial stability 
risks arising from nationwide bank consolidation. Thus, antitrust analysis alone 
cannot prevent bank mergers from adversely affecting consumers and the 
financial system. As a practical matter, therefore, regulators must shift the 
emphasis of bank merger oversight beyond competition to the other statutory 
factors. 
B. The Normative Justification for Expansive Bank Merger Review 
From a normative perspective, Congress was correct to instruct the 
agencies to consider a broad range of factors when evaluating a bank merger. 
Banks, it is commonly said, are special.185 Because of banks’ inherent riskiness 
and unique role in the economy, policymakers have long regulated banks more 
heavily than other industries.186 According to many observers, this additional 
scrutiny is warranted in order to (1) protect public claimants, (2) limit 
externalities, and (3) preserve equitable norms.187 Each of these traditional 
justifications for financial regulation militate in favor of multifactorial bank 
merger oversight. 
Bank regulation’s primary goal—protecting the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance 
Fund (DIF) and other public claimants—supports strong prudential oversight in 
the bank merger process. One needs to look no further than Bank of America’s 
ill-fated combination with Countrywide and other unsuccessful pre-crisis 
mergers for evidence that regulators should closely scrutinize the financial and 
managerial strength and future prospects of the merging firms.188 Bank failures 
not only inflict costs on uninsured creditors and the DIF, they also have the 
potential to impose losses on taxpayers through government assistance to 
troubled institutions or advances to the DIF.189 To protect these public 
claimants, therefore, the banking agencies must critically evaluate whether 
merger applicants are capable of expanding in a safe and sound manner. 
 
184. See supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text. 
185. See, e.g., E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?: A Revisitation, FED. RES. BANK 
MINNEAPOLIS (Mar. 1, 2000), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/are-banks-
special [https://perma.cc/MWA9-C5ND]. 
186. See MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: LAW & POLICY 76-78 (2d ed. 2018). 
187. See id. 
188. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
189. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF 
THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL 51 (2011) (estimating that the federal government guaranteed 
at least $4.4 trillion of financial assets under emergency programs at the peak of the financial crisis); see 
also 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a)(1) (2018) (authorizing the FDIC to borrow from the Treasury Department). 
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Broad bank merger regulation is likewise appropriate to mitigate 
externalities and systemic risk. A bank’s financial distress can impose costs not 
only on the public claimants discussed above, but also on other parties with 
direct or indirect exposures to the firm.190 Banks may transmit systemic risk by 
defaulting on counterparty exposures or by triggering a domino effect among 
interconnected financial institutions.191 Similarly, a bank’s financial distress 
may spark copy-cat bank runs or a contraction of the money supply.192 And, as 
the 2008 crisis vividly demonstrated, bank failures can have widespread 
societal costs in the form of higher unemployment, lost household wealth, and 
foregone economic growth.193 For all of these reasons, it is imperative that 
regulators assess potential externalities when evaluating a bank’s proposal to 
expand via merger. It is therefore appropriate that Congress amended the bank 
merger statutes in 2010 to require the agencies to consider financial stability 
separately from the traditional competitive analysis.194 
Finally, bank merger regulation should take into account equitable norms 
and other social considerations, such as an applicant’s consumer protection 
record and its ability to serve diverse communities. Professor Mehrsa 
Baradaran calls this the social contract in banking: banks enjoy the unique right 
to accept deposits backed by explicit and implicit government support, and in 
return they agree to make credit and other financial services broadly available 
to the general public.195 This social contract demands that banks do more than 
merely abide by banking laws and regulations. Rather, as Baradaran contends, 
the social contract necessitates that banks affirmatively serve the public in 
exchange for their continued license to operate.196 Against this background, it 
is rational for the agencies to consider the effect of a merger on the 
“convenience and needs of the community to be served.”197 Banks enjoy 
government protection and support, and the public should therefore expect that 
when a bank expands via merger, its growth will affirmatively benefit society. 
To be sure, banks may incur private costs when pursuing socials goals—
 
190. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198-204 (2008) (defining 
systemic risk). 
191. See id. at 198. 
192. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 401-02 (1983) (discussing bank runs); see also Robert C. Hockett & 
Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1158-61 (2017) (justifying 
bank regulation on the basis of government control over the money supply); Morgan Ricks, Money and 
(Shadow) Banking: A Thought Experiment, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 731, 743 (2012) (characterizing 
depository banking as a public-private partnership for the distribution of the money supply); Lev 
Menand, The Monetary Basis of Bank Supervision 155-70 (Aug. 6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3421232 [https://perma.cc/2MJP-4D48] (asserting that bank supervision is 
principally justified by the government’s need to oversee the money supply). 
193. See BARR ET AL., supra note 186, at 59-64 (discussing social and economic consequences 
of the financial crisis). 
194. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
195. See Baradaran, supra note 12, at 1285-86. 
196. See id.; see also Corrigan, supra note 185 (asserting that banks have “unique public 
responsibilities” in light of the public safety net they enjoy). 
197. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(5), 1842(c) (2018). 
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providing financial services in LMI areas tends to be less profitable than in 
upper-income areas.198 But the social contract in banking justifies the public-
oriented mandates in the bank merger statutes and the CRA. 
Despite the compelling normative rationale for the banking agencies to 
consider a broad range of factors in bank merger reviews, they have rarely done 
so in practice. Instead, the agencies have generally deemphasized statutory 
factors other than competition. A more expansive approach to policing bank 
mergers is needed in order to protect public claimants, limit externalities, and 
preserve equitable norms. The next Part proposes a framework for how the 
agencies should revive long-neglected factors in the bank merger statutes and 
thereby safeguard the public from the risks of unrestrained bank consolidation. 
IV. Modernizing Bank Merger Review 
This Part analyzes three statutory factors that the agencies have typically 
glossed over in merger reviews: financial stability, public interest 
considerations, and the applicant’s financial resources. It explains why the 
agencies’ current approach to each factor is lacking, and it proposes reforms to 
correct these deficiencies. By adopting the recommendations herein, the 
banking agencies can strengthen the application process to ensure that a bank is 
permitted to expand through merger only if it can do so safely and while 
enhancing the public welfare. 
A. Financial Stability 
Before the 2008 financial crisis, the banking agencies generally did not 
consider potential financial stability risks when evaluating merger applications. 
If anything, policymakers viewed consolidation as a net positive for financial 
stability because mergers were thought to increase bank profits and thereby 
improve safety and soundness.199 Thus, policymakers approved record-
breaking mergers in the 1990s without closely scrutinizing possible stability 
risks.200 A decade later, of course, the 2008 crisis exposed the danger of such 
megamergers.201 Ironically, to save the financial system from complete 
collapse, policymakers orchestrated emergency mergers by Bank of America, 
JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo, leading to widespread critiques that these 
combinations further exacerbated the “too-big-to-fail” problem.202 
 
198. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS 140-43 (2015). 
199. See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 111, at 1394. 
200. See, e.g., Travelers Grp. Inc., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 985 (1998); NationsBank Corp., 84 Fed. 
Res. Bull. 858 (1998). 
201. For a discussion of how megamergers created the “too-big-to-fail” institutions at the 
center of the 2008 crisis, see Baker, supra note 1, at 357-62. 
202. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
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In response to the crisis and the ensuing public backlash, Congress added 
a new financial stability factor to the BHC and Bank Merger Acts in 2010.203 
Specifically, when the agencies evaluate a merger proposal, they now must 
take into account possible “risk[s] to the stability of the United States banking 
or financial system.”204 Thus, Congress insisted that the agencies consider 
whether a proposed merger could either create or intensify a too-big-to-fail 
problem.205 
To fulfill this mandate, the banking agencies established an analytical 
framework to assess a proposed merger’s financial stability implications. The 
Federal Reserve explained its approach in a 2012 order approving Capital 
One’s acquisition of ING Bank.206 Under this framework, the Federal Reserve 
assesses both the resulting firm’s systemic footprint and the incremental effect 
of the proposed acquisition on the firm’s systemic importance. The agency 
considers a variety of metrics, including the resulting firm’s size, complexity, 
interconnectedness, cross-border activities, and the availability of substitute 
providers for the firm’s products and services.207 As the core of its analysis, the 
Federal Reserve calculates the resulting firm’s share of assets, deposits, 
wholesale funding, intra-financial system assets, and other key metrics relative 
to the entire U.S. financial sector.208 The Federal Reserve may deny a merger if 
it concludes, based on these data, that “the failure of the resulting firm, or its 
inability to conduct regular-course-of-business transactions, would likely 
impair financial intermediation or financial market functioning so as to inflict 
material damage on the broader economy.”209 
 
203. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 604(d)-(f), 124 Stat. 1376, 1601-02 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2018)). 
204. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (2018). This language in the Bank Merger Act differs slightly 
from the financial stability factor in the BHC Act. The BHC Act requires the Federal Reserve to 
consider “the extent to which a proposed merger, acquisition, or consolidation would result in greater or 
more concentrated risks to the stability of the United States banking or financial system.” 12 U.S.C. § 
1842(c)(7) (2018). The rationale for the different wording is unclear and, in any event, the functional 
differences between the two standards do not appear to be significant. See Tarullo, supra note 13, at 28-
29 n.21. 
205. Cf. Hilary J. Allen, What Is “Financial Stability”? The Need for Some Common 
Language in International Financial Regulation, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 929, 932-35 (2014) (discussing 
divergences in the ways international financial regulators approach financial stability standards). 
206. See Capital One Fin. Corp., 98 Fed. Res. Bull. 7, 23-27 (2012). For Bank Merger Act 
applications that involve a parallel BHC Act filing, the OCC and FDIC generally defer to the Federal 
Reserve’s financial stability analysis. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen A. Lybarger, Deputy Comptroller, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Lisa Goodglick, Associate Gen. Counsel, Capital One Fin. 
Corp. 7-8 (Oct. 17, 2012), https://www.occ.gov/topics/ 
licensing/interpretations-and-actions/2012/crad153.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLU6-PXLY]. 
207. Capital One Fin. Corp., 98 Fed. Res. Bull. at 23-24. The Federal Reserve also considers 
qualitative factors, including the likely difficulty of resolving the resulting firm if it were to fail. See id. 
at 24. 
208. See id. at 24-27. For example, the Federal Reserve calculated that, after acquiring ING 
Bank, Capital One would control 1.5% of assets, 2.3% of deposits, 1% of wholesale funding, and 1% of 
intra-financial system assets in the entire U.S. financial sector. See id. 
209. Id. at 23. 
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This framework is undoubtedly an advancement over the agencies’ pre-
financial crisis merger analysis, which ignored systemic risk considerations 
entirely. Despite this improvement, however, the agencies’ current approach to 
financial stability analysis is still suboptimal in three critical respects. 
First, the agencies’ financial stability framework lacks clarity and 
analytical rigor. Although the Federal Reserve has identified relevant 
quantitative metrics—e.g., the resulting firm’s share of U.S. financial system 
assets, or its proportion of outstanding U.S. credit card balances—it has not 
explained how it evaluates these data. It is unclear, for example, whether the 
Federal Reserve considers certain metrics to be more important than others or 
how the agency ultimately decides, based on these data, whether the resulting 
firm’s distress would destabilize financial markets. The Federal Reserve’s 
financial stability analysis, moreover, omits metrics that other regulators have 
found relevant in assessing an institution’s systemic importance. The Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) evaluates a broad range of data when 
deciding whether a nonbank financial company is sufficiently systemically 
important to warrant enhanced regulation.210 For instance, FSOC considers the 
volume of outstanding credit-default swap contracts on the company’s debt and 
the potential for the firm to depress asset prices through an emergency fire 
sale—factors omitted from the Federal Reserve’s framework.211 Thus, the 
agencies’ financial stability analysis is both vague and relatively rudimentary. 
Second, the agencies have not established an upper limit on financial 
stability risks in bank merger proposals. In the decade since Congress enacted 
the financial stability factor, the agencies have not denied a merger on financial 
stability grounds. Nor have they issued rules or guidance identifying the types 
of mergers that they would deem impermissible under the financial stability 
factor.212 In 2013, former Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo stated that 
he would presumptively deny an acquisition by any of the eight U.S. firms 
deemed to be G-SIBs by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision.213 Tarullo, 
however, left the Federal Reserve in 2017, and it is unclear whether his 
 
210. See Financial Stability Oversight Council Guidance for Nonbank Financial Company 
Determinations, 12 C.F.R. § 1310, app. A, § III (2020). 
211. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE 
BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION 
REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. 21, 44-49 (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/Prudential-Financial-Inc-Rescission.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YC7D-JYGQ]. 
212. The Federal Reserve has, however, established a safe harbor for certain transactions that 
presumptively would not increase risks to financial stability. Specifically, the Federal Reserve presumes 
that a transaction will not raise financial stability concerns if it involves the acquisition of less than $10 
billion in assets or results in a firm with less than $100 billion in total assets. See People’s United Fin., 
Inc., 103 Fed. Res. Bull. 50, 63 (2017). 
213. Tarullo, supra note 13, at 21. The eight U.S. G-SIBs are Bank of America, Bank of New 
York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells 
Fargo. See FIN. STABILITY BD., 2018 LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (G-SIBS) 3 
(2018), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P161118-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8GQ-7WQM]. 
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successors would apply the same presumption.214 The absence of well-defined 
limits creates uncertainty and could, over time, result in the agencies approving 
larger and riskier mergers. 
Finally, the agencies have not only failed to establish sensible ex ante 
systemic risk limits, but they also have demonstrated unreasonably high 
systemic risk tolerance. Despite the new financial stability factor, the agencies 
have continued approving mergers among the largest U.S. banks. In 2011, the 
agencies signed off on PNC Bancorp’s acquisition of RBC Bank, creating the 
United States’ fifth largest bank with $290 billion in assets.215 The following 
year, the agencies approved Capital One’s purchase of ING Bank, surpassing 
PNC as the country’s fifth largest bank with $292 billion in assets.216 In late 
2019, regulators unanimously approved BB&T’s “merger of equals” with 
SunTrust, creating a firm with $450 billion in assets.217 In each case, the 
agencies concluded that the mergers would not materially increase risks to U.S. 
financial stability.218 
The agencies’ high tolerance for these recent mergers is in tension with 
empirical research and historical experience suggesting that such deals can 
pose a risk to the financial system. As discussed above, numerous empirical 
studies have demonstrated that greater consolidation in the financial sector 
increases systemic risks.219 One particularly relevant study by Federal Reserve 
economists showed that the collapse of a single $250 billion bank would be far 
worse for the economy than if five $50 billion banks failed separately.220 
Moreover, depository institutions like Washington Mutual, Countrywide, and 
National City—all similar in size to Capital One, PNC, BB&T, and SunTrust—
proved to be systemically important when they collapsed in 2008.221 The 
agencies, however, have not even acknowledged—let alone rebutted—this 
cautionary evidence in the context of their recent bank merger approvals. 
 
214. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Daniel K. Tarullo Submits Resignation as a 
Member of the Board of Governors, Effective on or Around April 5, 2017 (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20170210a.htm [https://perma.cc/JUK8-
Z9AZ]. 
215. See PNC Bancorp., Inc., 98 Fed. Res. Bull. 16, 16-17 (2012). 
216. See Capital One Fin. Corp., 98 Fed. Res. Bull. 7, 7-8 (2012). 
217. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board 
Announces Approval of Application by BB&T Corporation to Merge with SunTrust Banks (Nov. 19, 
2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/ 
orders20191119a.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZQZ-WKGP]; Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC 
Approves the Merger Between BB&T and SunTrust (Nov. 19, 2019), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2019/pr19111.html [https://perma.cc/64SM-4PS4]. 
218. See Capital One Fin. Corp., 98 Fed. Res. Bull. at 27; PNC Bancorp., 98 Fed. Res. Bull. 
at 25. 
219. See supra notes 156, 158 and accompanying text. 
220. See Lorenc & Zhang, supra note 22, at 12-18. 
221. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Raising SIFI Threshold to $250B Ignores Lessons of Past 
Crises, AM. BANKER (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/raising-sifi-threshold-to-
250b-ignores-lessons-of-past-crises [https://perma.cc/P4BJ-5BPV]. 
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Taken together, these shortcomings suggest that the agencies should adopt 
a more systematic and stringent approach to their financial stability analyses. 
The agencies’ ill-defined financial stability framework contrasts sharply with 
their clear-cut approach to competitive considerations in bank merger 
applications. Recall that the agencies rely on the HHI—calculated by summing 
the squared market shares of each firm in the market—to determine if a 
proposed merger would substantially lessen competition in a geographic 
market.222 The agencies use the HHI to assess both the post-merger market 
concentration and the incremental change in concentration, just as the financial 
stability analysis attempts to assess the resulting firm’s systemic footprint and 
the incremental change in the firm’s systemic importance. The HHI, however, 
is significantly more systematized than the nebulous financial stability 
framework. Adopting an analogous index-based framework for systemic risk 
could significantly enhance the clarity, analytical rigor, and efficacy of the 
agencies’ financial stability analyses. 
Conveniently, over the past decade, scholars and policymakers have 
developed numerous quantitative metrics to assess a financial institution’s 
systemic importance. SRISK, for example, measures a firm’s expected capital 
shortfall in a severe market decline, based on its size, leverage, and risk.223 
Conditional Value-at Risk (CoVaR) quantifies the extent to which distress at a 
single firm would increase the riskiness of the broader financial system.224 The 
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS), meanwhile, has developed a 
formula to compute a firm’s systemic risk score based on a its size, complexity, 
interconnectedness, cross-jurisdictional activity, and substitutability—the same 
criteria the banking agencies use in their financial stability analyses.225 These 
metrics “back test” well—that is, if they had been in use before 2008, they 
would have been remarkably accurate in predicting ex ante which firms would 
become the most systemically important during the crisis.226 
These quantitative systemic risk measurements can be important 
regulatory tools. Indeed, policymakers already rely on these metrics in several 
contexts. For example, the Federal Reserve uses the BCBS’s systemic risk 
formula to assign risk-based capital requirements to the most systemically 
important banks.227 In 2018, the Federal Reserve proposed to further 
 
222. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. The agencies follow a clear-cut rule: a merger 
generally does not pose competitive concerns unless the post-merger HHI is at least 1,800 and merger 
increases the HHI by more than 200 points. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
223. See Christian Brownlees & Robert F. Engle, SRISK: A Conditional Capital Shortfall 
Measure of Systemic Risk, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 48, 51-56 (2017) (describing SRISK). 
224. See Tobias Adrian & Markus K. Brunnermeier, CoVaR, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 1705, 1706 
(2016). 
225. See BCBS Assessment Methodology, supra note 27, at 4-11. For a comprehensive 
overview of these and other systemic risk metrics, see Diimtrios Bisias et al., A Survey of Systemic Risk 
Analytics, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 225 (2012). 
226. See Brownlees & Engle, supra note 223, at 62-63; Adrian & Brunnermeier, supra note 
224, at 1730. 
227. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.400-.404 (2020). 
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incorporate the BCBS’s systemic risk formula in the U.S. regulatory regime by 
using it to determine a systemically-important bank’s leverage capital 
requirements.228 Moreover, the FSOC has considered a nonbank financial 
company’s SRISK when evaluating whether to designate the firm for enhanced 
regulation.229 Policymakers, in sum, deem these metrics sufficiently reliable to 
use them when making significant regulatory decisions. 
Building on this trend, the banking agencies should systematize their bank 
merger analysis by creating an HHI equivalent for financial stability. The 
agencies could use SRISK, CoVaR, the BCBS systemic risk score, or other 
systemic risk metrics to assess both the resulting firm’s systemic footprint and 
the incremental change in the firm’s systemic importance.230 The agencies 
could issue a rule or guidance establishing thresholds beyond which they would 
presumptively deny a merger on financial stability grounds. For example, the 
agencies could adopt a presumption against a merger where the resulting firm’s 
BCBS systemic risk score exceeds 50 and the merger increases the score by at 
least 5 points.231 Alternatively, they could set a threshold based on the firm’s 
SRISK—for example, when the firm’s post-merger SRISK is at least $2.5 
billion and the merger increases the firm’s SRISK by at least $250 million, 
given a 40% market decline.232 These threshold levels, of course, are merely 
suggestions, and the agencies would set limits that are informed by 
econometric analyses and public notice and comment.233 Further, the agencies 
 
228. See Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage 
Ratio Standards for U.S. Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies and Certain of Their 
Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions; Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity Requirements for U.S. 
Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies, 83 Fed. Reg. 17317 (Apr. 19, 2018) (codified 
at 12 C.F.R. § 217.11 (2020)). 
229. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE 
BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION 
REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 49 n.133 (2017), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/American_International_Group,_Inc.
_(Rescission).pdf [https://perma.cc/2T8R-YKFD]. 
230. Other systemic risk metrics the agencies might use for this purpose include codependence 
risk, which measures how a firm’s credit risk affects other institutions’ credit risk, and lower tail 
dependence, which assesses the likelihood of a firm’s stock collapsing given a systemic crisis. See INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RESPONDING TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
AND MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISK 14-18, 77 (2009), 
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/01/pdf/
text.ashx [https://perma.cc/T5PU-69DZ] (describing codependence risk); Weiss et al., supra note 21, at 
168 (describing lower tail dependence). 
231. As a reference point, U.S. Bancorp’s and PNC Financial Services Group’s most recent 
publicly available BCBS systemic risk scores were 41 and 34, respectively. See OFFICE OF FIN. 
RESEARCH, supra note 183, at 7 (2017). 
232. By way of comparison, Regions Financial Corporation’s SRISK was approximately $2.2 
billion in July 2019, given a 40% market decline. See Systemic Risk Analysis, V-LAB, 
https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/analysis/RISK.USFIN-MR.MESSIM [https://perma.cc/TS65-BAY9]. SRISK 
may be suboptimal relative to the BCBS systemic risk score because a firm may be able to temporarily 
decrease its SRISK by increasing its reported capital ratios or otherwise altering its balance sheet 
composition before filing a merger application. 
233. The agencies could retain discretion to approve a merger in excess of the systemic risk 
limits in an emergency situation, when denial of the merger would jeopardize financial stability. By 
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need not rely exclusively on a single quantitative metric. Instead, the optimal 
approach might be to create a composite financial stability score combining 
these metrics. 
An HHI equivalent for financial stability would be a significant 
improvement over the current ad hoc approach. A systematized methodology 
would enhance the analytical rigor of the financial stability framework by 
standardizing how the agencies evaluate systemic risk data. If codified in 
rulemaking or guidance by appropriately precautionary regulators, a systemic 
risk limit could prevent agencies from approving increasingly risky mergers in 
the future.234 Furthermore, an HHI equivalent would add clarity to an otherwise 
opaque process and thereby reduce confidential pre-merger consultations 
between banks and their regulators.235 If banks have greater certainty about 
how the agencies will evaluate systemic risk, they will have less need to confer 
confidentially with the agencies before signing a merger agreement. 
Previous efforts to systematize bank merger financial stability analysis 
have been dismissed as premature. The Federal Reserve initially considered 
issuing a rule or guidance on the financial stability factor but ultimately 
rejected the idea because “[t]here simply isn’t the accumulation of experience 
and of thoughtful evaluation of these issues by people both in and out of 
government to inform something akin to the merger guidelines published by 
the antitrust agencies.”236 As Former Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo 
noted, the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) only codified their 
antitrust merger guidelines after 60 years of experience with merger analysis.237 
Despite these objections, it is now appropriate—indeed, necessary—for 
the agencies to formalize their approach to the financial stability factor. First, 
systemic risk analysis has advanced dramatically in the decade since the 
Federal Reserve first considered issuing a rule or guidance on the financial 
stability factor. While reliable systemic risk metrics might not have existed in 
the immediate aftermath of the 2008 crisis, scholars and policymakers have 
now developed a wide array of sophisticated tools that the agencies could use 
to create an HHI equivalent for financial stability.238 Second, the banking 
agencies cannot afford to wait as long as the antitrust agencies to develop 
formal guidelines because the societal consequences of lax financial stability 
policy are far greater than weak antitrust enforcement. While the DOJ and FTC 
could spend decades refining their antitrust analyses without significant harm 
 
contrast, the agencies could also retain discretion to deny a merger below the systemic risk limits if 
other factors indicated that the transaction would increase risks to financial stability. 
234. A quantitative systemic risk limit for bank mergers would be an example of what 
Professor Robert Weber has called a “structural regulation” response to “complexity capture”—using a 
structural approach to overcome limitations in discretionary financial regulation. See generally Robert F. 
Weber, Structural Regulation as Antidote to Complexity Capture, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 643 (2012). 
235. See supra Section II.A. 
236. Tarullo, supra note 13, at 19. 
237. Id. at 16. 
238. See, e.g., Bisias et al., supra note 225, at 260 (discussing various systemic risk metrics). 
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to consumers, delaying the implementation of an HHI equivalent for financial 
stability risks triggering another financial crisis. Finally, time is of the essence 
for the agencies to establish appropriate systemic risk limits in light of 
anticipated consolidation among regional and super-regional banks in the near 
future.239 
In sum, the banking agencies’ approach to the financial stability factor has 
been vague and ineffective. The good news, however, is that researchers have 
developed numerous quantitative tools that could be used to systematize and 
strengthen the financial stability analysis in bank merger applications. The 
agencies should incorporate these metrics into the bank merger review process 
to ensure that bank consolidation does not imperil the financial system yet 
again. 
B. Public Interest Factors 
In addition to financial stability, the banking agencies consider the public 
interest as a distinct factor in merger applications. In fact, under the BHC and 
Bank Merger Acts, the public interest is of paramount importance. As the 
Supreme Court asserted in United States v. Third National Bank in Nashville, 
the public interest is “the ultimate test imposed” in a bank merger 
application.240 
The banking agencies take into account the public’s interest in three ways 
when evaluating a merger proposal. First, the agencies consider “the 
convenience and needs of the community to be served.”241 At its core, this 
inquiry assesses whether a proposed merger will produce benefits to the public, 
such as increased access to credit or expanded product offerings.242 Second, the 
agencies weigh the relevant banks’ records of compliance with fair lending and 
other consumer protection laws.243 Third, the agencies consider the banks’ 
records of serving LMI communities under the CRA.244 Collectively, these 
considerations reflect Congress’s intent that “a merger should be judged in 
terms of its overall effect on the public interest.”245 
Despite this mandate, however, the agencies have not prioritized the 
public interest in bank merger reviews. To the contrary, the agencies’ public 
interest analyses are typically perfunctory and often focus on advantages to the 
merging banks—such as projected cost savings—rather than to their 
 
239. See Walsh, supra note 35. 
240. 390 U.S. 171, 184 (1968). 
241. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(5), 1842(c)(1)-(2) (2018). 
242. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
243. See, e.g., ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY IN THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S APPLICATIONS 
PROCESS, supra note 30, at 3. 
244. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831u(b)(3), 1842(d)(3), 2903(a)(2) (2018). 
245. Third National Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. at 185. In that case, the Supreme Court struck 
down a merger on the ground that the lower court had not considered whether the relevant banks could 
achieve the purported public benefits through means other than the merger. See id. at 190-92. 
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consumers.246 Similarly, the agencies regularly approve applications by banks 
with only marginal consumer compliance and CRA records, despite public 
protests opposing such mergers.247 The agencies, in sum, too often subordinate 
the interests of the public to those of merging banks. 
This Section proposes a framework to reinvigorate public interest 
considerations in bank merger oversight. It recommends several reforms. For 
example, in light of the potential negative effects of bank consolidation, the 
agencies should begin reviewing a merger proposal with a strong presumption 
that the combination will not produce benefits to the public. Moreover, 
Congress should empower the CFPB—the agency with the most insight into 
large banks’ consumer compliance records—to block a bank merger on public 
interest grounds, similar to the DOJ’s power to enjoin an anticompetitive bank 
merger. Finally, the agencies should insist that applicants have outstanding 
CRA records as a condition of bank merger approval. Collectively, these 
reforms would help elevate the public interest as the paramount consideration 
in bank merger regulation. 
1. Convenience and Needs of the Community 
Under the BHC and Bank Merger Acts, the banking agencies must take 
into account “the convenience and needs of the community to be served” when 
evaluating a proposed bank merger or acquisition.248 The agencies, in essence, 
are supposed to analyze how a proposed merger will affect the public welfare. 
In practice, however, rather than conducting a searching inquiry, the agencies 
typically assume that a transaction will benefit the public. To fulfill their 
statutory mandate, therefore, the agencies need a new paradigm for evaluating 
the public benefits of proposed bank mergers. 
The “convenience and needs” standard appears twice—and serves two 
distinct purposes—in the bank merger statutes. “Convenience and needs” first 
appears as part of the competitive analysis. That is, under the BHC and Bank 
Merger Acts, an agency may approve a merger that would substantially lessen 
competition or create a monopoly if it concludes that “the anticompetitive 
effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest 
by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs 
of the community to be served.”249 Thus, an agency may balance a merger’s 
potential anticompetitive effects against its welfare-enhancing outcomes. 
 
246. See infra Section IV.B.1. Professor David Zaring has noted that the banking agencies 
have likewise deemphasized the public interest in de novo bank charter applications. See David Zaring, 
Modernizing the Bank Charter, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author) 
(“The agency spends no time evaluating the public interest in a new bank, or nudging a bank towards 
policy priorities of the government. Instead, it [sets] . . . an ultimately low bar . . . .”). 
247. See infra Sections IV.B.2, IV.B.3. 
248. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(5), 1842(c)(1)-(2) (2018). 
249. Id. §§ 1828(c)(5)(B), 1842(c)(1)(B). 
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By contrast, the second instance of the “convenience and needs” standard 
clarifies that the public welfare is its own, independent consideration in bank 
merger applications, separate from the competitive analysis. Congress 
specifically required that “[i]n every case, the responsible agency shall take 
into consideration . . . the convenience and needs of the community to be 
served.”250 Therefore, even in an application with no antitrust concerns, the 
agencies must assess whether the merger will enhance the public welfare.251 
The “convenience and needs” factor thus serves a dual purpose—it is both a 
potential counterweight for anticompetitive effects and an independent 
consideration in every merger application. 
Substantively, the “convenience and needs” standard is expansive, 
encompassing a wide range of public welfare considerations. The “convenience 
and needs” factor includes the merging banks’ records of compliance with 
consumer protection laws and their histories of meeting the credit needs of LMI 
populations under the CRA.252 But “convenience and needs” is significantly 
broader than the banks’ consumer compliance and CRA records alone.253 
Indeed, as the Supreme Court stated, the “convenience and needs” standard 
asks whether the proposed merger would “secur[e] better banking service for 
the community.”254 Thus, the “convenience and needs” factor assesses the 
extent to which the proposal will enhance the public welfare, broadly 
defined.255 
 
250. Id. § 1828(c)(5) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1842(c)(2) (requiring the Federal 
Reserve to take into account convenience and needs in BHC Act applications). 
251. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 351 (emphasizing that the “convenience and needs” 
standard is broader than the antitrust balancing test). 
252. See, e.g., Fifth Third Bancorp, 105 Fed. Res. Bull. 70, 75-82 (2019) (assessing banks’ 
consumer compliance and CRA records as part of the “convenience and needs” analysis). Consumer 
compliance and CRA considerations are discussed in Sections IV.B.2 and IV.B.3. 
253. See Warren L. Dennis, The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977: Defining 
“Convenience and Needs of the Community”, 95 BANKING L.J. 693, 711 (1978); Wilson, supra note 28, 
at 362-63. 
254. United States v. Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 188 (1968). 
255. The “convenience and needs” standard that applies to a bank merger or a BHC’s 
acquisition of a bank differs somewhat from the “public benefit” standard that governs a BHC’s 
acquisition of a nonbank financial company. When a bank merges with another bank or when a BHC 
acquires a bank, the Bank Merger Act and section 3 of the BHC Act provide that the relevant agency 
must take into account “the convenience and needs of the community to be served.” 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1828(c)(5), 1842(c)(1)-(2) (2018). By contrast, when a BHC acquires a nonbank financial company such 
as a broker-dealer or insurance underwriter, section 4 of the BHC Act requires that the Federal Reserve 
assess whether the acquisition “can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public . . . that 
outweigh possible adverse effects.” 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A) (2018). The biggest difference between 
these standards is procedural. Under section 4 of the BHC Act, the Federal Reserve must affirmatively 
find that a proposal’s expected public benefits outweigh the possible adverse effects in order to approve 
a nonbank acquisition. See id. Under the Bank Merger Act and section 3 of the BHC Act, however, the 
relevant agency is only required to “take into account” the convenience and needs of the community and 
need not make an affirmative finding of public welfare enhancement, absent anticompetitive effects. See 
12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(5), 1842(c)(1)-(2) (2018). Substantively, however, the “convenience and needs” 
and the “public benefit” standards both require consideration of a proposed transaction’s effect on the 
public welfare. See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 12, at 1337 & n.311 (conflating the public interest 
standards under sections 3 and 4 of the BHC Act). 
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At first, the agencies took seriously their responsibility to analyze the 
convenience and needs of the community under the BHC and Bank Merger 
Acts. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the agencies often noted that a 
proposed merger would increase a bank’s lending limit.256 At the time, federal 
law generally prohibited a bank from lending more than 10% of its capital to 
any one borrower.257 An expansionary merger typically increased a bank’s 
capital base and, accordingly, its lending limit.258 In many cases, therefore, a 
bank merger proposal directly benefitted businesses and consumers who 
previously had been unable to obtain substantial loans due to a bank’s 
restrictive lending limits.259 
Early on, the agencies also seriously considered whether a proposed 
merger would enhance the convenience and needs of the community by 
expanding the range of banking products and services available to consumers. 
An acquirer might introduce new products or services that the target bank 
previously had not offered.260 For example, the agencies found the introduction 
of overdraft checking, credit-card services, and extended banking hours via 
merger to be significant enhancements to the convenience and needs of the 
public.261 By contrast, when a proposed merger would not affirmatively benefit 
the public through expanded products or services, the agencies often denied the 
application.262 Thus, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the agencies prioritized 
the “convenience and needs” standard and insisted that bank merger proposals 
benefit the public welfare. 
More recently, however, the agencies have treated the “convenience and 
needs” standard as an afterthought. After Congress adopted the CRA in 1977, 
the agencies began neglecting the “convenience and needs” standard as an 
independent consideration in bank merger applications. As Professor Baradaran 
observed, “After the enactment of the CRA . . . the focus of the public benefit 
 
256. See, e.g., Detroitbank Corp., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 926, 927 (1977); Union Bank, 57 Fed. 
Res. Bull. 247, 248 (1971). 
257. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1970). 
258. See Casson & Burrus, supra note 11, at 679. 
259. See Detroitbank Corp., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. at 927 (“[A]ffiliation with Applicant would 
increase bank’s lending limits at a time when there appears to be an increasing demand by local 
industries for large loans.”); Union Bank, 57 Fed. Res. Bull. at 248 (“Customers . . . would benefit by 
the merger because Union Bank . . . through its larger lending limit would be better able to meet the 
needs of medium-sized business customers.”). 
260. See David R. Allardice, Convenience and Needs: A Post-Audit Survey, 4 ECON. PERSP. 
20, 20 (1978). 
261. See id.; see also Jessee & Seelig, supra note 116, at 152 (“Improvements affecting the 
convenience and needs of the community . . . have often taking the form of new services . . . not yet 
offered in a locale.”). 
262. See, e.g., Associated Bank Servs., Inc., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 284, 285 (1972) 
(“[C]onsummation of Applicant’s proposal would result in no significant benefit to the convenience or 
needs of the community to be served. The record indicates that the area’s needs are being served 
adequately by the banks serving the area.”); Fla. Nat’l Banks of Fla., Inc., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 57, 58 
(1972) (“Consummation of the proposed transaction would have little impact on the convenience and 
needs of banking customers in the area since Applicant proposes no new service not already offered by 
other banks in the area.”). 
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test shifted to ask whether the bank was in compliance with the CRA, which 
served as a rubber stamp for meeting the public benefit test.”263 Although the 
agencies now consider the banks’ history of meeting the credit needs of LMI 
communities under the CRA, “there [is] no inquiry as to the benefits of the 
merger.”264 This distinction is significant—the CRA evaluates a bank’s past 
performance, but the “convenience and needs” standard is supposed to assess 
whether a merger will produce future public benefits.265 
Over the past several decades, the “convenience and needs of the 
community” has virtually evaporated as an independent issue in bank merger 
applications. Today, the agencies barely mention convenience and needs in 
their merger decisions. When the agencies do refer to convenience and needs, 
they merely repeat the applicant’s “representations” about benefits that will 
accrue from the merger.266 The agencies, however, analyze neither the 
significance of these purported benefits nor the likelihood that they will 
materialize.267 At times, the agencies consider anticipated benefits to the 
companies—such as projected cost savings and profitability—as public 
benefits.268 Mitria Wilson confirmed the agencies’ indifference toward the 
“convenience and needs” standard in a comprehensive review of post-financial 
crisis bank merger decisions. Wilson concluded that “[i]n the vast majority of 
the financial regulatory institutions’ orders on bank merger or acquisition 
applications [since the crisis], there is no discussion of the regulators’ analysis 
of the public-interest provision beyond a single reference to the fact that the 
regulator considered the issue.”269 
One explanation for the disappearance of the “convenience and needs” 
standard is that bank mergers no longer benefit the public as they did in the 
past. Consider increased lending limits, which the agencies traditionally cited 
as a benefit of bank mergers.270 Modern-day bank mergers are unlikely to 
enhance the public welfare through elevated lending limits for two reasons. 
First, Congress increased the loan-to-one-borrower threshold from 10 to 15% 
 
263. Baradaran, supra note 12, at 1339-40. 
264. Id. 
265. Wilson, supra note 28, at 362-63; see also id. at 362 (“[T]here is nothing in the 
applicable langue of the [CRA] that would support the view that a record of past performance . . . could, 
by itself, be dispositive of the issue of whether a proposed merger satisfies the public-interest inquiry 
required under the [BHC] and Merger Acts.”). 
266. See, e.g., Fifth Third Bancorp, 105 Fed. Res. Bull. 70, 81-82 (2019) (noting that Fifth 
Third represented that the proposed merger would expand consumers’ access to its retail and 
commercial banking services); Synovus Bank, 103 Fed. Res. Bull. 67, 77 (2017) (noting that Synovus 
Bank represented that the proposed merger would increase its deposit base and thereby allow it to 
provide more loans). 
267. See Baradaran, supra note 12, at 1338 (“Despite the public benefit test’s salience, in 
practice no searching inquiry into the actual needs of the public is undertaken.”). 
268. See id. at 1338-39. 
269. Wilson, supra note 28, at 372 n.8. 
270. See supra notes 256-259 and accompanying text. 
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of a bank’s capital and surplus in 1982.271 Thus, banks are significantly less 
constrained in making large loans than they were in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Second, many U.S. banks have grown so large that no single borrower is likely 
to require a loan in excess of the bank’s lending limit.272 Accordingly, 
increasing a bank’s lending limit is no longer a compelling justification for 
most bank mergers. 
Similarly, it is questionable whether many modern-day bank mergers 
introduce new financial products and services to underserved communities. 
Innovative product offerings are already more widely available today than they 
were in the 1960s and 1970s due to increased competition and internet 
banking.273 Even in mergers where the acquirer offers a broader range of 
products and services than the target bank, the target is often capable of 
providing expanded offerings on its own.274 Moreover, some of the expanded 
products and services that the agencies cite as public benefits, such as appraisal 
services, are of only marginal value to consumers.275 Thus, the public generally 
does not need bank mergers in order to access critical financial products and 
services.276 
In sum, modern-day bank mergers do not appear to benefit the public as 
they might have in the mid-twentieth century. Yet the agencies have largely 
abandoned their statutory duty to assess the public welfare in bank merger 
deals. Today, the agencies typically address the “convenience and needs” 
standard perfunctorily, without seriously questioning whether a merger would, 
in fact, benefit consumers. Banks, in turn, have recognized the banking 
agencies’ disinterest in the public welfare. In Capital One’s application to 
 
271. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-230, § 401(a), 96 
Stat. 1469, 1508 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2018)). A bank may lend an additional 10% of 
its capital and surplus to such borrower if the loan is fully secured by readily marketable collateral. See 
12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(2) (2018). 
272. See generally Kress, supra note 4, at 179-88 (documenting dramatic growth of U.S. 
banks). Moreover, even if a potential loan exceeds a bank’s lending limit, the bank may comply with the 
lending limit by reducing its exposure through loan participations. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(q)(2)(vi)(A) 
(2020). 
273. See, e.g., Catherine J. Bell & Jeanne M. Hogarth, U.S. Households’ Access to and Use of 
Electronic Banking, 1989-2007, 95 FED. RES. BULL. A99, A104-07 (2009) (discussing trends in 
consumer adoption of electronic banking). 
274. The agencies previously denied mergers where the target bank was capable of providing 
expanded products and services on its own, in the absence of an acquisition. See, e.g., First Fin. Corp., 
58 Fed. Res. Bull. 480, 481 (1972); First Fin. Corp., 56 Fed. Res. Bull. 654, 655-56 (1970); see also 
Carstensen, supra note 11, at 588. 
275. See, e.g., Nat’l City Corp., 93 Fed. Res. Bull. C44, C47 (2007). 
276. To be sure, many consumers and small businesses still lack adequate banking services, 
especially in so-called banking deserts. See The Community Reinvestment Act: Assessing the Law’s 
Impact on Discrimination and Redlining: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. 
(2019) (statement of Mehrsa Baradaran, Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law), 
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba15-wstate-baradaranm-20190409-u2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G55Q-WYC5]. Bank mergers and acquisitions, however, are unlikely to enhance 
banking access in LMI neighborhoods. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing post-
merger branch closures in LMI areas). 
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acquire ING Bank in 2011, for example, Capital One included just a single 
paragraph purporting to describe the public benefits of the merger.277 
The banking agencies’ indifference to the “convenience and needs” 
standard is cause for concern. Congress expected the agencies to prioritize the 
public welfare in bank merger reviews—indeed, it repeated the “convenience 
and needs” standard twice in each of the bank merger statutes. In practice, 
however, the agencies simply assume that bank merger proposals benefit the 
public, without serious analysis. This assumption is deeply flawed, in light of 
evidence suggesting that modern-day bank mergers, on balance, reduce the 
availability of credit, increase costs to consumers, and exacerbate financial 
stability risks.278 
In light of this evidence, the banking agencies should establish a new 
paradigm for analyzing the “convenience and needs” standard in bank merger 
applications. In an optimal framework, the agencies would: (1) begin with a 
presumption that a proposed merger would not benefit the public; (2) insist that 
the applicant identify concrete, verifiable ways in which the transaction would 
create better banking services for the community; and (3) quantify these public 
benefits where possible. Collectively, these reforms would ensure that the 
agencies fulfill their statutory obligation to assess whether a merger proposal is 
in the public interest. 
First, the agencies should apply a presumption that bank mergers 
generally do not enhance the public welfare. The agencies, in essence, should 
flip their current presumption. Whereas recent bank merger approvals have 
implicitly assumed that consolidation benefits the public, going forward, the 
agencies should expressly acknowledge the empirical evidence that bank 
mergers tend to result in detriments to the public. These detriments, of course, 
include increased loan costs, lower deposit rates, and less small business 
lending.279 The agencies’ presumption against public benefits should be 
particularly strong for mergers among the United States’ largest banks, wherein 
concerns about market power are most acute and benefits of scale are doubtful, 
at best.280 
Second, in order to overcome this presumption, the agencies should 
require bank merger applicants to identify concrete, verifiable ways in which a 
proposed transaction will help the community. Although modern-day bank 
 
277. CAPITAL ONE FIN. CORP., NOTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 4 OF THE BANK 
HOLDING COMPANY ACT BY CAPITAL ONE FIN. CORP. TO ACQUIRE ING BANK, FSB, SHAREBUILDER 
ADVISORS, LLC AND ING DIRECT INVESTING, INC. 38-39 (July 15, 2011), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/files/Notification-re-Captial-One-to-acquire-ING.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6YB9-JRHR]. 
278. See supra Section II.B. 
279. See id. 
280. Professor Jesse Markham has noted the paradox that the agencies consider potential 
economies of scale in bank merger proposals, but they do not take into account possible diseconomies of 
scale. See Markham, supra note 94, at 302 (“While efficiencies of scale are considered in approving 
transactions, inefficiencies of scale are not, such that mergers resulting in inefficiently large scale are 
not disapproved on that particular ground.”). 
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mergers generally do not create the types of public benefits the agencies 
previously recognized,281 such mergers could enhance the convenience and 
needs of the community in other ways. For example, an acquisition might save 
a troubled bank from potential failure, or it might replace a target’s ineffective 
management. Moreover, there may be some situations in which an acquiring 
bank offers critical products or services, such as small business loans, that 
otherwise would be unavailable to the target bank’s customers. Rather than 
merely restating an applicant’s “representations” about public benefits, 
however, the agencies must carefully evaluate the likelihood that the purported 
benefits will, in fact, occur.282 The purported benefits should be definite and 
not “speculative”—a standard to which the agencies previously adhered but 
have since relaxed considerably.283 
Finally, the agencies should attempt to quantify the value of public 
benefits arising from a merger in order to more accurately weigh policy trade-
offs inherent in bank consolidation. In the past, the agencies have not been 
transparent about how they balance the societal costs of reduced competition 
and greater systemic risk against purported enhancements to convenience and 
needs, suggesting a lack of analytical rigor in their review process.284 
Attempting to quantify the value of purported public benefits would help 
alleviate this concern. To be sure, some scholars have expressed skepticism 
about recent efforts to introduce quantitative cost-benefit analyses into 
financial regulation on the ground that imprecise “guesstimates” expose 
regulations to ex post second-guessing by reviewing courts.285 But the agencies 
need not subject a bank merger proposal to a complete cost-benefit analysis; 
simply attempting to quantify the expected benefits to the community will 
enhance the analytical rigor and clarity of bank merger reviews. Even a 
rudimentary attempt to quantify public benefits will make it more likely that 
bank mergers actually enhance the convenience and needs of the community. 
In sum, over the past forty years, the banking agencies have effectively 
ignored the “convenience and needs” standard as an independent criterion in 
bank merger reviews. As a result of this omission, the agencies now routinely 
approve bank mergers despite little evidence of public benefits and without 
acknowledging the compelling data on the social costs of bank consolidation. 
 
281. See supra notes 270-272 and accompanying text. 
282. As one federal district court stated, the agency “should specify particularly what [it] finds 
to be the convenience and needs of the community” and “what [it] considers will be the effect of the 
merger thereon . . . .” United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat’l Bank, 263 F. Supp. 125, 138 (N.D. Cal. 
1966). 
283. See N. Star Fin., Inc., 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 609, 610 (2000) (denying proposed acquisition 
because purported financial and managerial improvements were “speculative”). 
284. See Jessee & Seelig, supra note 116, at 162. 
285. John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and 
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 960 (2015); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-
Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 373-75 (2014); Jeremy C. Kress, 
Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches 
to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1487-88 (2019). 
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To rectify this inequity, therefore, the agencies should insist on persuasive, 
quantifiable evidence of social benefits to overcome a presumption that bank 
mergers generally do not benefit the public. Only then can the agencies fulfill 
their statutory obligation to ensure bank mergers enhance the convenience and 
needs of the communities to be served. 
2. Consumer Compliance 
As part of the public interest analysis, the agencies also consider the 
merging banks’ records of compliance with fair lending and other consumer 
protection laws. Although not specifically required by statute, the agencies 
have traditionally taken into account the merging banks’ compliance records to 
assess whether the combined institution would have the capacity to implement 
effective consumer protection systems.286 Over time, however, the agencies 
have neglected their consumer protection responsibilities, including consumer 
compliance evaluations in bank merger applications.287 After the financial 
crisis, Congress transferred many of the federal banking agencies’ consumer 
protection authorities to the CFPB.288 Lawmakers, however, did not give the 
newly created consumer agency a formal role in bank merger applications. This 
Section contends that, in order to restore consumer compliance as a central 
consideration in bank merger oversight, Congress should empower the CFPB 
to block bank merger proposals, similar to the DOJ’s authority to enjoin 
anticompetitive mergers. 
The banking agencies began considering merger applicants’ consumer 
compliance records during the 1970s, when Congress enacted a wave of 
consumer protection legislation. As part of the merger review process, the 
agencies evaluated the acquiring and target banks’ histories of compliance with 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,289 Fair Housing Act,290 Truth in Lending 
Act,291 and numerous other consumer protection laws and regulations. At the 
time, the federal banking agencies had primary authority to supervise banks’ 
compliance with these rules, and they drew on their supervisory experience in 
 
286. See Matthew Z. Zamora, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Compliance Perspective, 10 
SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS 10, 10 (2013). The agencies originally considered a bank’s consumer 
compliance record as part of their assessment of the firm’s management. See, e.g., Johnson Int’l, Inc., 81 
Fed. Res. Bull. 507, 508 (1995). More recently, however, the agencies have clarified that consumer 
compliance is a component of the “convenience and needs” assessment. See SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON 
BANKING APPLICATIONS—YEAR-END 2018, supra note 14, at 4. 
287. For an analysis of how federal banking agencies neglected their consumer protection 
responsibilities in the lead-up to the financial crisis, see Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making 
Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 86-95 (2008). 
288. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1022, 1025, 124 Stat. 1376, 1980-85, 
1990-93 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5512, 5515 (2018)). 
289. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2018). 
290. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2018). 
291. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2018). 
10. KRESS ARTICLE. PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  10:09 AM 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:435, 2020 
484 
 
assessing merger applicants’ consumer compliance records.292 The agencies 
explicitly stated that a poor consumer compliance record could warrant denial 
of an application, even if the banks had satisfactory CRA performance.293 And, 
in fact, the agencies often denied mergers on consumer compliance grounds up 
until the 1990s.294 
In the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis, however, the agencies largely 
abandoned their consumer compliance responsibilities. As the consumer-
focused ethos of the 1970s faded, the agencies relaxed their enforcement of 
consumer protection rules, focusing instead on their core responsibility of bank 
safety and soundness.295 During this time, consumer compliance effectively 
evaporated as a constraint on bank mergers. Despite frequent fair lending 
protests by community groups and consumer advocates, the banking agencies 
regularly approved sizeable mergers by banks with questionable consumer 
compliance records.296 
The financial crisis exposed the inadequacy of the banking agencies’ 
laissez faire approach to consumer protection, leading to a comprehensive 
overhaul of the financial regulatory system. Many observers blamed the 
banking agencies’ lax consumer protection policies for exacerbating the 
subprime mortgage crisis.297 In response, Congress created the CFPB and 
transferred rulemaking and enforcement authority over most consumer 
protection laws from the banking agencies to the new consumer bureau.298 In 
addition, Congress gave the CFPB exclusive jurisdiction to supervise banks 
with more than $10 billion in assets and their affiliates for compliance with 
most consumer financial protection laws.299 Thus, the federal banking agencies 
 
292. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 287, at 86-89 (discussing the banking agencies’ 
authority to supervise compliance with consumer protection laws prior to the Dodd-Frank Act). 
293. See Totalbank Corp. of Fla., 81 Fed. Res. Bull. 876, 878 (1995) (“[D]isregard for 
consumer compliance laws provides a separate basis for concluding that convenience and needs 
considerations do not warrant approval of an application, even if an applicant has a satisfactory record 
of performance under the CRA.”). 
294. See id.; see also Johnson Int’l, Inc., 81 Fed. Res. Bull. 507 (1995); First State Holding 
Co., Inc., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 802 (1981). 
295. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 287, at 90-91, 93-95; Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 329-34 (2013); see also 
Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency: A Cornerstone of America’s New Economic 
Foundation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 60 (2009) 
(statement of Michael S. Barr, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, Department of the 
Treasury) [hereinafter Barr Testimony]. 
296. See, e.g., Wachovia Corp., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. 183, 189-90 (2006); Bank of Am. Corp., 90 
Fed. Res. Bull. 217, 224-25, 231-32 (2004); JPMorgan Chase Bank, 2004 WL 1369433, at *2, *9 
(2003). 
297. See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: 
RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 167-205 (2011); Barr Testimony, supra 
note 295, at 60-63. 
298. See Levitin, supra note 295, at 357-58. 
299. 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a) (2018); see also id. § 5481(12), (13) (enumerating relevant 
consumer financial protection laws). The federal banking agencies retain supervisory authority over 
consumer compliance by banks with $10 billion or less in assets. See Levitin, supra note 295, at 358. In 
addition, the federal banking agencies retain supervisory authority over banks with more than $10 
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now play a comparatively minor role in consumer financial protection, 
especially with respect to the largest banks. 
Despite this significant regulatory revamp, Congress did not give the 
CFPB a formal role in bank merger review. Even though the CFPB now has 
exclusive supervisory authority over consumer compliance by large banks, it 
has no independent voice in bank merger applications. Instead, the banking 
agencies—which lack direct oversight of big banks’ consumer compliance—
continue to assess bank merger applicants’ consumer compliance records. To 
be sure, the banking agencies consult with the CFPB about bank merger 
applications on an informal, confidential basis.300 And the CFPB may share 
consumer compliance examination reports with the banking agencies.301 But 
the agencies are not required to accept the CFPB’s recommendations on a 
merger application, and the CFPB lacks a formal mechanism to stop a merger it 
believes will harm consumers. 
The CFPB’s exclusion from the bank merger application process is 
problematic. The banking agencies have a well-documented history of 
downplaying banks’ consumer compliance problems—indeed, that is why 
Congress created the CFPB in the first place.302 Vesting the federal banking 
agencies with final authority to assess consumer compliance in merger 
applications therefore increases the risk that banks with deficient compliance 
systems will be permitted to expand. Furthermore, knowing that the banking 
agencies deemphasize consumer compliance, prospective merger applicants 
will have insufficient incentives to maintain strong compliance systems. 
Excluding the CFPB from bank merger review minimizes the importance of 
consumer compliance and thereby imperils the public welfare. 
Mere consultation between the banking agencies and the CFPB as part of 
the application process is insufficient for two reasons. First, informal 
consultation provides no mechanism for resolving conflicts when the banking 
agencies and the CFPB disagree about the merits of a merger proposal. Instead, 
if the banking agencies and CFPB differ on a merger application, the banking 
agencies automatically prevail by virtue of their final decision-making 
authority, leaving the CFPB without recourse to protect consumers. Second, 
relegating the CFPB to a consultative role reduces its incentive to evaluate 
bank merger proposals carefully. The CFPB might choose not to devote 
resources to interagency discussions on bank merger proposals, knowing that it 
is not accountable for rendering final decisions on merger proposals and that, in 
 
billion in assets for compliance with certain consumer financial protection laws, including the Fair 
Housing Act, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CONSUMER COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL § II-13.4 n.7 (2017), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/complianceexaminationmanual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UP5H-ENYT]. 
300. Cf. Fifth Third Bancorp, 105 Fed. Res. Bull. 70, 81 (2019) (noting that the Federal 
Reserve consulted with the CFPB about Fifth Third’s consumer compliance record). 
301. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(6)(C)(i) (2018). 
302. See supra notes 295-299 and accompanying text. 
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any event, the banking agencies might ignore its input. Accordingly, the 
banking agencies’ informal consultation with the CFPB cannot substitute for 
the Bureau’s formal participation in bank merger reviews. 
Nor is it adequate that the Director of the CFPB sits on the FDIC’s Board 
of Directors.303 Almost all of the largest U.S. banks are chartered as national 
banks and overseen by the OCC, not the FDIC.304 As a result, the FDIC, and by 
extension the CFPB Director, is excluded from merger applications involving 
the biggest banks—the precise deals on which the CFPB is likely to have 
supervisory insight.305 Moreover, even in the rare cases when the FDIC has 
jurisdiction over a big-bank merger, the FDIC’s four other board members—
whose primary focus is bank safety and soundness, not consumer protection—
can outvote the CFPB Director.306 This divergence between bank safety-and-
soundness and consumer protection as regulatory objectives is the exact reason 
why the CFPB was created in the first place.307 The CFPB Director’s 
representation on the FDIC’s Board of Directors is far from sufficient to ensure 
that consumer compliance is a central consideration in bank merger oversight. 
For these reasons, Congress should establish an official role for the CFPB 
in the bank merger application process. The CFPB’s formal participation in 
reviewing the consumer compliance aspects of bank merger proposals would 
mirror the DOJ’s official role in assessing the antitrust effects of bank 
consolidation. Recall that, in addition to the banking agencies’ antitrust 
analyses under the bank merger statutes, Congress directed the DOJ to 
independently review bank mergers’ potential anticompetitive effects under the 
antitrust laws.308 Just as the DOJ has expertise in antitrust analysis that the 
banking agencies lack, so too does the CFPB have unique insight into 
 
303. Cf. Thomas P. Vartanian, Fix CRA Before Cracking Down on Bank Mergers, AM. 
BANKER (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/fix-cra-before-cracking-down-on-
bank-mergers [https://perma.cc/8J97-X2K4] (“[T]he CFPB already has an approval role in bank mergers 
since the agency’s head sits on the board of the FDIC, which decides on many bank mergers.”). 
304. See BARR ET AL., supra note 186, at 174 (noting that the largest U.S. banks tend to be 
chartered as national banks). 
305. Consider, for example, TCF National Bank’s acquisition of Chemical Bank in 2019.  
TCF had well more than $10 billion in assets and was therefore supervised by the CFPB. TCF had well-
documented consumer compliance deficiencies—according to one measure, consumers lodged more 
complaints against TCF than any other U.S. bank in 2018. See Jeremy Kress, CFPB Should Have a Say 
in Bank Mergers, AM. BANKER (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cfpb-should-
have-a-say-in-bank-mergers. But because TCF was chartered as a national bank the OCC—and not the 
FDIC—was responsible for reviewing the merger application. See Letter from Stephen A. Lybarger, 
Deputy Comptroller for Licensing, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Spencer A. Sloan, 
Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP (June 20, 2019), https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-
licensing/interpretations-and-actions/2019/crad197.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ27-RM5F]. Like most big 
bank mergers, therefore, the CFPB Director’s seat on the FDIC Board therefore did not afford the CFPB 
an opportunity to review TCF’s acquisition. 
306. See 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1) (2018) (establishing the membership of the FDIC Board of 
Directors); see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MISSION, VISION, AND VALUES, 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/mission.html [https://perma.cc/8ZL9-SXEJ] (stating that 
the FDIC’s mission is to “maintain stability and public confidence in the nation’s financial system”). 
307. See supra notes 297-298 and accompanying text. 
308. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. 
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consumer compliance, especially at larger banks. Likewise, both the DOJ 
Antitrust Division and the CFPB are singularly focused on protecting 
consumers, while the banking agencies tend to concentrate on bank safety and 
soundness.309 It is sensible, therefore, for both the DOJ and the CFPB to have 
official roles in bank merger applications. 
In many ways, the CFPB’s formal participation in the bank merger 
process is even more essential than the DOJ’s. In the antitrust arena, the 
banking agencies at least have access to underlying market structure data to 
calculate the HHI in geographic markets that would be affected by a merger 
proposal.310 In the consumer arena, however, the banking agencies lack critical 
information necessary to assess a firm’s compliance systems. The supervisors 
that conduct day-to-day oversight of consumer compliance systems at the 
largest banks are housed within the CFPB. Although the CFPB may share its 
examination reports with the banking agencies,311 the banking agencies may 
lack the institutional knowledge, context, and experience to interpret these 
findings. The case for including the CFPB in bank merger oversight is 
therefore even more compelling than involving the DOJ. 
The CFPB’s role in bank merger reviews could be structured in several 
different ways. For example, Congress could authorize the CFPB to challenge a 
bank merger in court if a banking agency approves a proposal without the 
CFPB’s concurrence, similar to the DOJ’s authority.312 Alternatively, Congress 
could require bank merger applicants to file concurrent applications with the 
relevant banking agencies and the CFPB, thereby giving the Bureau formal 
authority to approve or deny a merger.313 Regardless of how the CFPB’s 
authority is structured, it is essential that Congress give the CFPB a formal role 
in bank merger oversight and thereby correct a significant omission from the 
CFPB’s original statutory authorities. 
Accordingly, it makes little sense for the banking agencies, which have 
been stripped of their consumer-focused supervisory authority, to evaluate 
merger applicants’ consumer compliance records, while the CFPB is relegated 
to an informal advisory role. Excluding the CFPB from the application process 
reduces consumer compliance to an afterthought in bank merger reviews, 
thereby threatening the public welfare. Accordingly, just as Congress has 
authorized the DOJ to bring its antitrust expertise to bear in bank merger 
applications, lawmakers should likewise empower the CFPB to protect 
consumers by giving it an independent voice in bank merger reviews. 
 
309. See supra note 295 and accompanying text. 
310. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis maintains the Competitive Analysis Structure 
Source Instrument for Depository Institutions, or CASSIDI, a publicly available database of geographic 
banking markets and concentration levels. See CASSIDI, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
https://cassidi.stlouisfed.org [https://perma.cc/6GFN-U2GX]. 
311. See supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
312. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(7), 1849(b)(1) (2018). 
313. An ex ante application requirement might be preferable to ex post enforcement authority 
so that the CFPB need not disclose confidential supervisory information in a judicial proceeding. 
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3. Community Reinvestment Act Performance 
In addition to the foregoing factors, Congress directed the banking 
agencies to consider whether a merging bank serves traditionally neglected 
populations. Specifically, the agencies must assess an applicant’s performance 
under CRA, which instructs banks to meet the credit needs of their entire 
communities, including LMI areas.314 In practice, however, the agencies have 
undermined the CRA’s objectives by allowing banks with marginal CRA 
records to merge. This Section recommends that the banking agencies apply 
more rigorous CRA performance standards in bank merger applications to 
ensure that only firms genuinely committed to serving LMI communities are 
permitted to expand. 
Congress adopted the CRA in 1977 to combat redlining—the practice of 
banks refusing to lend to borrowers in minority areas.315 The CRA imposes an 
“affirmative obligation” on banks “to help meet the credit needs of [their] local 
communities,” with a special emphasis on LMI neighborhoods.316 The banking 
agencies periodically examine banks to assess their performance under the 
CRA.317 The agencies evaluate a bank on three metrics: (1) lending activities, 
including home mortgage, small business, and community development loans 
(the lending test);318 (2) investment activities, including grants and other 
support for affordable housing and community development financial 
institutions (the investment test);319 and (3) the efficacy of the bank’s systems 
for delivering retail banking and community development services (the service 
test).320 Based on these factors, the relevant agency assigns the bank one of 
four overall CRA ratings: Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or 
Substantial Noncompliance.321 
Policymakers enforce the requirements of the CRA primarily through the 
bank merger application process. As Professors Macey and Miller have noted, 
 
314. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (2018). 
315. For background on the CRA, see DAN IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY: 
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 133-67 (2004); 
Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 513, 523-26 (2005); Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-
Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1573-74 (1995); and 
Macey & Miller, supra note 95, 298-303. 
316. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (2018). 
317. Id. § 2903(a)(1). The agencies typically evaluate banks with more than $250 million in 
assets every three years. See Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Questions and Answers, OFF. 
COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/compliance-bsa/cra/questions-and-
answers.html [https://perma.cc/74SX-263H]. Banks with less than $250 million in assets are evaluated 
at least every five years. 12 U.S.C. § 2908(a) (2018). 
318. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.22(a)(1), 228.22(a)(1), 345.22(a)(1) (2020). For small banks, the 
agencies apply streamlined versions of these tests. See id. §§ 25.26, 228.26, 345.26. 
319. Id. §§ 25.23, 228.23, 345.23. 
320. Id. §§ 25.24, 228.24, 345.24. For each test, the relevant agency assigns a rating of 
Outstanding, High Satisfactory, Low Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or Substantial Noncompliance. See 
Id. §§ 25 app. A, 228 app. A, 345 app. A. 
321. Id. §§ 25.28(a), 228.28(a), 345.28(a). 
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a bank is “not automatically sanctioned for failing to satisfy [its] CRA 
obligations.”322 Instead, the main consequence of a poor CRA rating is a 
potential restriction on the bank’s ability to merge.323 Congress specifically 
directed the agencies to take a bank’s CRA record into account in all bank 
merger applications.324 In practice, the agencies place great weight on a merger 
applicant’s CRA record. Although a bank’s CRA rating is supposed to be just 
one component of the overall “convenience and needs” analysis, the agencies 
often treat it as dispositive of the public interest inquiry.325 
The agencies, however, apply the CRA in a way that is highly permissive 
of bank consolidation. Neither the bank merger statutes nor the CRA establish 
a minimum CRA rating for a bank to be eligible to merge. Like the other bank 
merger statutory factors, Congress simply directed the banking agencies to 
consider an applicant’s CRA rating.326 And like the other statutory factors, the 
agencies have chosen to interpret this mandate in a way that is unduly 
favorable to merging banks. 
The agencies have established lenient standards for merger applicants’ 
CRA performance, and they have continued to relax these rules over time. In 
the 1980s, the agencies adopted an unwritten policy favoring approval of a 
merger application if the bank had at least a Satisfactory overall CRA rating, 
even if the firm received a Low Satisfactory or Needs to Improve rating on one 
or more of its performance tests.327 The agencies denied applications on CRA 
grounds only in the rare case that the applicant had received a Needs to 
Improve or Substantial Noncompliance overall rating on its most recent CRA 
exam.328 The agencies have since codified this policy of presumptively 
approving proposals by firms with at least Satisfactory CRA ratings, as long as 
other statutory factors are consistent with approval.329 The agencies, however, 
have suggested that a less-than-satisfactory CRA rating may no longer be a 
barrier to a merger approval. In November 2018, agency officials indicated that 
they are open to approving merger applications by banks with Needs to 
Improve or Substantial Noncompliance ratings if the firms demonstrate 
 
322. Macey & Miller, supra note 95, at 300. 
323. The bank can also be restricted from opening new branch offices. See id. 
324. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2) (2018); see also id. § 1842(d)(3). 
325. See, e.g., First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 706, 707 (1993) (“[A] CRA 
examination is an important and often controlling factor in determining whether convenience and needs 
factors are consistent with approval of an expansionary proposal.” (emphasis added)). 
326. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2); see also id. § 1842(d)(3). 
327. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 80 (describing informal discussions with Federal Reserve 
staff). 
328. See, e.g., First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 706, 707 (1993); Gore-
Bronson Bancorp, Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 784, 785-86 (1992); First Interstate BancSystem of Mont., 
Inc., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 1007, 1008-10 (1991); Continental Ill. Bancorp, Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 304, 
304-06 (1989). 
329. See ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY IN THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S APPLICATIONS PROCESS, 
supra note 30, at 3; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., APPLICATIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL § 1.10 (2019); 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, PPM 6300-2, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL: 
IMPACT OF CRA RATINGS ON LICENSING APPLICATIONS 1-2 (2017). 
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progress since their last CRA evaluations.330 The agencies, in sum, have 
generally welcomed expansion by banks with questionable records of serving 
LMI areas. 
The agencies’ permissive approach to the CRA in bank merger 
applications has grave consequences for LMI areas. Banks have responded by 
“satisficing,” or doing the bare minimum to achieve a Satisfactory CRA rating, 
and no more.331 As Professor Kenneth Thomas has observed, “there are few if 
any real incentives for banks to go for CRA gold,” so firms “tend to be happy 
with the middle ground.”332 As a result, more than 90% of banks are currently 
rated Satisfactory, and few even try for an Outstanding rating.333 Meanwhile, 
many LMI areas continue to lack access to traditional banking services.334 
Thus, although the CRA represents a potentially powerful tool to increase 
credit to LMI areas, the agencies undermine this goal by applying lenient 
standards to bank merger proposals. 
To address this problem, the agencies should strengthen their standards 
for the CRA factor in bank merger applications. The agencies could reform 
their approach in several ways to ensure that a bank is permitted to expand only 
if it effectively serves LMI neighborhoods. For example, the agencies could 
establish a presumption against a merger by a bank with a Low Satisfactory 
rating or below on any of its performance tests. Additionally, the agencies 
could take into account all of a bank’s CRA performance evaluations, rather 
than only its most recent evaluation, to assess its long-term commitment to 
LMI areas.335 Most significantly, the agencies could require that a bank receive 
an Outstanding overall CRA rating to obtain regulatory approval for a merger 
proposal. Thus, rather than rewarding minimally compliant banks with merger 
approvals, the agencies should insist that merger applicants demonstrate 
exceptional records of serving LMI populations under the CRA. 
To be sure, the CRA is imperfect and could be improved. As banking 
markets evolve, for example, policymakers may need to adapt banks’ CRA 
 
330. See Joe Mantone, Banks Could Get out of M&A Penalty Box Sooner, Regulator Says, 
S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.spglobal.com/ 
marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/0xccl6qtxfgklta1awkpmg2 [https://perma.cc/FC5L-
NW22]. 
331. Kenneth H. Thomas, Banks Learn the Price of ‘Satisfactory’ CRA Grades, AM. BANKER 
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/banks-learn-the-price-of-satisfactory-cra-
grades [https://perma.cc/PUH9-T7ZQ]. 
332. Id. 
333. See id. Only when a bank anticipates filing a merger application does it strategically 
increase its lending to LMI populations. See Raphael Bostic et al., Regulatory Incentives and 
Consolidation: The Case of Commercial Bank Mergers and the Community Reinvestment Act, 
ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, 2005, at 1, 8-11. 
334. See, e.g., BARADARAN, supra note 198, at 102-37 (discussing challenges faced by LMI 
borrowers). 
335. Under current practice, the agencies typically ignore all but a bank’s most recent CRA 
performance evaluation. See, e.g., Compass Bank, 102 Fed. Res. Bull. 58, 61 n.18 (2016). 
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assessment areas to take into account their online activities.336 Likewise, the 
CRA could be updated to give banks credit for a wider variety of community 
development activities than are recognized under current CRA performance 
standards.337 In addition, commentators have raised concerns about community 
groups using CRA-focused protests to delay merger applications in an effort to 
extract community development pledges or other concessions from the 
banks.338 In response to these critiques, the FDIC and OCC proposed revisions 
to the CRA’s implementing regulations in late 2019.339 However, community 
groups have alleged that the proposed reforms would weaken the CRA, and the 
Federal Reserve has not signed on.340 Nonetheless, if appropriately designed, 
targeted CRA reforms could address some important shortcomings in the 
current law. 
To the extent that policymakers eventually revise the CRA, they should 
also enhance their expectations for bank merger applicants’ CRA performance. 
The application process is regulators’ primary mechanism for enforcing banks’ 
obligation to provide financial services to traditionally neglected populations. 
As they currently apply the CRA, however, the agencies incentivize banks to 
do the bare minimum to achieve a Satisfactory rating. Going forward, the 
agencies should strengthen their standards in merger applications to ensure that 
banks strive for excellence, rather than mediocrity, in meeting their CRA 
obligations. 
 *   *   * 
 
Sixty years ago when Congress established a comprehensive pre-approval 
regime for bank mergers, lawmakers expected that the banking agencies would 
prioritize the public interest in their assessment of merger proposals. Today, 
however, the agencies too often subordinate the public interest to those of 
merging banks. The proposals advanced above would reinvigorate the public 
benefits test, consumer compliance analysis, and CRA evaluations in 
connection with merger oversight. The agencies should adopt these 
recommendations to ensure that bank mergers enhance, rather than impede, the 
convenience and needs of the communities to be served. 
 
336. See Lael Brainard, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Remarks at the 2019 Just 
Economy Conference: The Community Reinvestment Act: How Can We Preserve What Works and 
Make it Better? 4-9 (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/ 
brainard20190312a.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FUS-DJ7V]. 
337. See id. at 9-11. 
338. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 95, at 333-37. 
339. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC and OCC Propose to 
Modernize Community Reinvestment Act Regulations (Dec. 12, 2019), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2019/nr-ia-2019-147.html [https://perma.cc/
5XFT-RN43]. 
340. See Neil Haggerty, House Democrats Implore Regulators to Get in Sync on CRA, AM. 
BANKER (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/house-democrats-implore-regulators-
to-get-in-sync-on-cra [https://perma.cc/AEK4-MXPG]. 
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C. Financial Resources 
Finally, the banking agencies should modernize their approach to 
assessing a merger applicant’s financial wherewithal. The bank merger statutes 
direct the agencies to consider “the financial . . . resources and future prospects 
of the existing and proposed institutions.”341 When evaluating a bank merger 
application, however, the Federal Reserve applies financial criteria that are so 
weak as to be functionally meaningless. This Section therefore urges the 
Federal Reserve to bolster its standards to ensure that only financially sound 
firms are permitted to expand. 
The rationale for considering a bank’s financial resources as part of a 
merger application is straightforward. Bank mergers inherently involve 
uncertainty, so consolidating banks should maintain an appropriate financial 
cushion to withstand unexpected challenges.342 Moreover, policymakers 
generally expect larger banks to maintain bigger financial buffers in light of 
their potential systemic importance.343 Thus, when a bank proposes to expand 
via acquisition, the relevant agency typically assesses its current and projected 
capital levels, liquidity, asset quality, level of indebtedness, and other financial 
metrics.344 Historically, the agencies have denied mergers when the applicants 
would incur too much debt or maintain insufficient capital.345 Most of these 
denials involved small banks. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the agencies 
occasionally denied significant mergers—such as The Bank of New York’s 
proposed acquisition of Northeast Bancorp—on financial grounds.346 
Although the bank merger statutes originally gave the agencies unfettered 
discretion to evaluate applicants’ financial resources, Congress established 
minimum capital requirements for merger applicants when it authorized 
interstate bank mergers in the 1994. The Riegle-Neal Act allowed the agencies 
to approve an interstate merger only if the resulting institution would be 
“adequately capitalized.”347 At the time, the agencies’ regulations deemed a 
bank to be adequately capitalized if it had at least a 4% Tier 1 risk-based 
capital ratio and an 8% total risk-based capital ratio, as well as a 4% leverage 
 
341. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (2018); see also id. § 1842(c)(2). 
342. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 72. 
343. See BARR ET AL., supra note 186, at 756-59. 
344. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 225.13(b)(1) (2020). 
345. See, e.g., Guar. Dev. Co., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 255, 256 (1986); Holcomb Bancshares, Inc., 
69 Fed. Res. Bull. 804, 805 (1983); Spur Bancshares, Inc., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 806, 807 (1983); Fin. Sec. 
Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 832, 834 (1972). 
346. See Bank of N.Y. Co., Inc., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 867, 869 (1990) (denying a merger 
application by New York’s fifth largest bank). 
347. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
328, §§ 101(a), 102(a), 108 Stat. 2338, 2339, 2346-47 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1831u(b)(4), 1842(d)(1)(A) (2018)). 
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ratio.348 In practice, the agencies encouraged organizations anticipating mergers 
to maintain capital ratios above these required minimums.349 These standards, 
however, were insufficient to prevent numerous recently merged banks from 
failing during the 2008 crisis.350 
After the crisis, Congress toughened financial standards for bank mergers. 
The Dodd-Frank Act provided that, rather than being merely “adequately 
capitalized,” merger applicants now needed to be “well capitalized” to obtain 
regulatory approval.351 Under the capital rules in effect when Dodd-Frank was 
enacted in 2010, firms had to maintain capital ratios roughly 50% higher than 
the minimum requirements to be considered well capitalized.352 Thus, Congress 
directed the agencies to approve bank mergers only if the firms’ capital levels 
are significantly above the minimum requirements. 
The problem, however, is that the Federal Reserve has now set the “well 
capitalized” threshold for BHCs so low that this standard is functionally 
meaningless. Soon after Congress passed Dodd-Frank, the banking agencies 
adopted the Basel III international capital accord, which substantially increased 
minimum capital requirements.353 Under Basel III, the Federal Reserve raised 
its minimum BHC capital requirements to a 4.5% common equity tier 1 ratio, 
6% tier 1 ratio, 8% total capital ratio, and a 4% leverage ratio.354 The Federal 
Reserve, however, barely changed the “well capitalized” threshold for 
BHCs.355 A BHC is now considered “well capitalized” if it maintains only a 
6% tier 1 ratio—the same as the minimum requirement—and a 10% total 
capital ratio—just 25% above the minimum.356 The “well capitalized” standard, 
 
348. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 6.4(b)(2), 208.33(b)(2), 325.103(b)(2) (1997). A bank that received the 
highest possible rating on its annual supervisory exam was deemed adequately capitalized if it 
maintained the applicable risk-based capital ratios and at least a 3% leverage ratio. See id. 
349. See 12 C.F.R. § 225, app. A, § IV (1997) (“[Banking o]rganizations experiencing or 
anticipating significant growth are also expected to maintain capital . . . well above the minimum 
levels.”). 
350. See, e.g., Heidi N. Moore, Wachovia-Golden West: Another Deal From Hell?, WALL ST. 
J. (July. 22, 2008), https://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/07/22/wachovia-golden-west-another-deal-from-
hell [https://perma.cc/T2BP-R5XW]; Shira Ovide, Bank of America-Countrywide: Worst Deal in 
History?, WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. (June 29, 2011, 2:25 PM ET), https://blogs.wsj.com/
deals/2011/06/29/bank-of-america-countrywide-worst-deal-in-history [https://perma.cc/B3G6-HT47]. 
351. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 607(a)-(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1607-08 (2010) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831u(b)(4)(B), 1842(d)(1)(A) (2018)). 
352. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 6.4(b)(1), 208.33(b)(1), 325.103(b)(1) (2010) (providing that a bank is 
well capitalized if it has at least a 6% Tier 1 and 10% total risk-based capital ratio, as well as a 5% 
leverage ratio); see also id. § 225.2(r) (providing that a BHC is well capitalized if it has at least a 6% 
Tier 1 and 10% total risk-based capital ratio). 
353. See Michael R. Crittenden & Dan Fitzpatrick, Big U.S. Banks Face Tougher Standards, 
WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278 
87323297504578581373434862806 [https://perma.cc/5X8R-U7E8]. 
354. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10(a) (2020). 
355. The agencies meaningfully increased the “well capitalized” thresholds for banks, but not 
BHCs. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 6.4(c), 208.43(b)(1), 325.103(b)(1) (2020) (providing that a bank that is a 
member of the Federal Reserve System is well capitalized if it has at least a 6.5% common equity tier 1 
ratio, 8% tier 1 ratio, 10% total capital ratio, and a 5% leverage ratio). 
356. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r)(1) (2020). 
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moreover, ignores a bank’s common equity tier 1 and leverage ratios. As 
depicted in Table 2, the current threshold for BHCs to be considered “well 
capitalized” is barely distinguishable from the minimum capital requirements. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Minimum Capital Requirements and “Well 
Capitalized” Threshold for Interstate Bank Mergers 
 




Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 4.5% N/A 
Tier 1 Ratio 6% 6% 
Total Capital Ratio 8% 10% 
Leverage Ratio 4% N/A 
 
The Federal Reserve’s “well capitalized” standard for BHCs is so lenient 
that it has no practical effect on merger applications. That is because a separate 
regulatory requirement—the Federal Reserve’s stress tests—effectively require 
BHCs to maintain capital that exceeds the “well capitalized” threshold. Stress 
tests are an annual exercise in which the Federal Reserve uses economic 
models to predict how a BHC’s balance sheet would perform in a recession.357 
By regulation, a BHC is not permitted to pay dividends or buy back shares 
unless it would exceed the minimum regulatory capital ratios in a hypothetical 
severe downturn.358 Oddly, a BHC that is merely “well capitalized”—with 6% 
tier 1 and 10% total capital ratios—would almost certainly fail the Federal 
Reserve’s stress tests. Capital One Financial Corporation, for example, nearly 
failed the 2019 stress tests despite maintaining 12% tier 1 and 15% total capital 
ratios.359 The stress tests, therefore, are far more demanding than the “well 
capitalized” standard. 
Because the Federal Reserve’s “well capitalized” threshold has not kept 
pace with the post-financial-crisis capital regime, the financial screening of 
 
357. For background on the Federal Reserve’s stress tests, see Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation 
by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1283-94; Robert F. Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-
Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2291-94 (2014); and Matthew C. Turk, 
Stress Testing the Banking Agencies, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5-14), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367546 [https://perma.cc/S66D-E65Z]. 
358. 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(f)(2)(iv) (2020). 
359. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL 
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2019: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 14 (2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2019-ccar-assessment-framework-results-
20190627.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E94-GNNM]. 
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BHC merger applicants is no longer meaningful. The Federal Reserve does not 
publicly stress test merger applicants’ consolidated balance sheets. Rather, 
when approving a BHC application, the Federal Reserve simply notes that the 
applicant is well capitalized and would remain so on consummation of the 
merger.360 A BHC, therefore, could be considered well capitalized—and thus 
able to merge—even if it were unable to withstand a hypothetical recession. 
This perverse outcome defies explanation. 
To address these shortcomings, therefore, the Federal Reserve must 
toughen its analysis of merger applicants’ financial resources. As an initial 
step, the Federal Reserve should substantially increase the “well capitalized” 
threshold for BHCs. In addition to raising the applicable tier 1 and total capital 
ratios, the Federal Reserve should establish common equity tier 1 and leverage 
components of the “well capitalized” test, because these metrics tend to be the 
most binding on BHCs.361 Strengthening the “well capitalized” threshold would 
ensure that firms are permitted to expand only if they hold significantly more 
financial resources than is expected of non-merging companies, consistent with 
congressional intent. Moreover, for larger firms that would be subject to stress 
tests on consummation of a merger, the Federal Reserve should conduct a 
stress test of the pro forma balance sheet as part of the merger application to 
assess how the consolidated firm would perform during a downturn. This 
dynamic, forward-looking exercise would ensure that the Federal Reserve 
evaluates the firm’s “future prospects,” as required by the BHC Act. 
In sum, to preserve rigor in the bank merger application process, the 
Federal Reserve must update and strengthen its approach to assessing 
applicants’ financial resources. The Dodd-Frank Act directed the banking 
agencies to ensure that merger applicants hold significantly more financial 
resources than non-merging banks in light of the uncertainties inherent in bank 
mergers. The Federal Reserve, however, has neglected to modernize the “well 
capitalized” standard for BHCs consistent with this mandate. Going forward, 
therefore, the Federal Reserve should toughen the “well capitalized” threshold 
and stress test merger applicants to ensure that only strong BHCs may expand 
through acquisition. 
 
*   *   * 
 
This Part has proposed a comprehensive approach to reinvigorating 
traditionally overlooked factors in the bank merger statutes. In order to 
safeguard the financial system, the agencies should establish quantitative 
systemic risk limits for bank mergers using widely accepted financial stability 
 
360. See, e.g., Fifth Third Bancorp, 105 Fed. Res. Bull. 70, 72 (2019). 
361. See Jill Cetina et al., Capital Buffers and the Future of Bank Stress Tests, OFF. FIN. RES. 
6 (2017), https://www.financialresearch.gov/briefs/files/OFRbr_2017_02_Capital-Buffers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z2SS-XFN4]. 
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metrics. In order to protect consumers, the agencies ought to demand 
compelling evidence that a proposed merger will benefit the public. 
Furthermore, the agencies should insist that a merger applicant have an 
Outstanding CRA rating, and Congress should give the CFPB an independent 
voice in bank merger oversight. Finally, to ensure that merging banks are 
financially strong enough to withstand unforeseen challenges, the agencies 
should increase their expectations for a merged bank’s capital buffer. In total, 
this comprehensive framework would refocus the agencies’ attention on these 
statutorily mandated factors and thereby strengthen bank merger oversight. 
V. Implications for Contemporary Merger Policy in Other Industries 
The 2020 presidential election has thrust the United States’ merger policy 
into the public debate, as policymakers seek tools to combat perceived 
concentration in numerous industries. Senator Elizabeth Warren, for example, 
has called for the reversal of agriculture mergers, such as Monsanto’s 2018 
combination with Bayer, which she says have hurt small farmers.362 Several 
presidential candidates have proposed breaking up big technology companies 
by undoing mergers like Facebook’s acquisitions of WhatsApp and Instagram, 
Amazon’s takeover of Whole Foods, and Google’s purchase of Waze.363 
Proponents of breaking up big technology firms contend that these mergers 
limit customers’ choices, invade consumers’ privacy, and hurt employees.364 In 
July 2019, the DOJ announced it was opening antitrust investigations into 
Facebook, Google, Amazon, Apple, and other technology firms.365 
Within the legal scholarship, there is considerable debate about whether 
U.S. antitrust laws permit authorities to consider nonprice factors such as 
consumer privacy and income inequality. Some scholars, such as Tim Wu and 
Lina Khan, insist that the existing antitrust laws encompass a broad range of 
public interest considerations and that policymakers should use these tools to 
address social ills.366 Other scholars, however, counter that broad populist 
concerns are outside the scope of the antitrust laws and that policymakers 
 
362. See Jeff Daniels, Elizabeth Warren Slams Big Agriculture, Unveils Plan for Reversing 
‘Anti-Competitive Mergers,’ CNBC (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/27/elizabeth-
warren-slams-big-agriculture-calls-to-reverse-mergers-to-aid-farmers.html [https://perma.cc/SEQ7-
24S6]. 
363. See, e.g., Astead W. Herdon, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Breaking Up Tech Giants Like 
Amazon and Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
03/08/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/4S36-YHSN]; Cristiano Lima, Bernie 
Sanders Says He Would ‘Absolutely’ Try to Break up Facebook, Google, Amazon, POLITICO (July 16, 
2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/16/bernie-sanders-facebook-google-amazon-1416786 
[https://perma.cc/X729-LRTA]. 
364. See Herdon, supra note 363. 
365. See Daisuke Wakabayashi et al., Justice Department Opens Antitrust Review of Big Tech 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
07/23/technology/justice-department-tech-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/N9G2-RW3W]. 
366. See WU, supra note 38, at 68-73, 135-39; Khan, supra note 38, at 739. 
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should maintain their traditional focus on price effects.367 The debate over this 
so-called “hipster antitrust” movement shows no signs of slowing.368 
Whatever one thinks of the general antitrust laws, however, the bank 
merger statutes are unambiguous: the banking agencies must consider factors 
other than the HHI when evaluating merger proposals. In the bank merger 
context, Congress specifically provided that financial stability, the convenience 
and needs of the community, and the future prospects of the institutions are all 
relevant considerations, in addition to competition. 
Despite this clear statutory mandate, however, the banking agencies have 
neglected factors outside of the traditional antitrust realm. After decades of 
near-complete focus on competitive considerations, policymakers and scholars 
have paid little attention to how they evaluate financial stability or consumer 
protection in merger proposals. In the meantime, the public has suffered the 
negative effects of bank consolidation in the form of branch closures, lower 
credit availability, higher crime, and increased systemic risk.369 
While scholars debate the reach of the general antitrust statutes, therefore, 
the banking agencies should lead the way by exercising their broad merger 
authority. In contrast to the general antitrust laws, the bank merger statutes 
clearly mandate consideration of non-price factors in merger proposals. It 
makes sense, of course, that merger standards for banks are broader than for 
other companies. The law has long recognized that banking poses unique risks 
to financial stability and consumer welfare that are less prevalent in other 
industries.370 As policymakers trend toward enlarging the scope of traditional 
merger review, therefore, it is especially critical that the banking agencies 
modernize their approach to bank merger oversight. 
Conclusion 
Over the past sixty years, financial regulators have allowed the once 
powerful bank merger review process to atrophy. This weakening is due, at 
least in part, to policymakers’ and scholars’ near-exclusive focus on antitrust, 
which has grown increasingly irrelevant as long-term trends in bank regulation 
and market structure have bolstered competition for financial services. 
Meanwhile, the banking agencies have failed to carefully consider whether 
proposed mergers would increase systemic risks, enhance the public welfare, 
and strengthen the relevant institutions. As a result, the agencies now rubber 
 
367. See Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable 
Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 326-40 (2019) (purporting to debunk the claim that lax 
antitrust enforcement has caused economic inequality). 
368. See id. at 293. 
369. See supra Section II.B. 
370. See, e.g., Corrigan, supra note 185 (concluding that banks perform economically unique 
functions). 
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stamp nearly all bank mergers despite evidence that such deals can harm 
consumers and destabilize the financial system. 
Collectively, the proposals advanced in this Article would modernize 
bank merger reviews and ensure that regulators apply appropriately stringent 
criteria for all of the factors in the bank merger statutes. The banking agencies 
should use all the analytical tools at their disposal to evaluate a merger’s 
financial stability risks. The CFPB should have an independent voice in the 
merger review process. Regulators should insist that merging banks invest 
more than the bare minimum in LMI communities. And merger applicants 
should maintain an extra capital cushion to protect against unforeseen 
challenges. If put into practice, these reforms would not only enhance the 
analytical rigor of the bank merger application process but also reorient the 
banking agencies’ focus onto the public welfare and financial stability, where it 
rightfully belongs. 
